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Preface 
 
The report you are holding in your hands is the outcome of the combined efforts of four 
students, working hard to educate themselves in order to become a competitive 
commodity on the global or European market place. We do this acknowledging that this 
might in fact be pointless, due to the hard competition we will probably face in the 
future from people from countries far away, ready to work for nothing. Still we keep 
going, hoping that we can keep our 'European Social Model' and our 'Flexicurity-
system', which will – if everything else fails – at least provide us with plenty of 
incentives to work for free as well. And, maybe we are not in such a big hurry after all, 
because we will apparently also have to educate ourselves for the rest of our lives, 
which will be considerably longer than the lives of past generations. For now we only 
have to worry about how we will finance the pensions of our parents and our 'Måmor', 
"the pension time bomb" as we call her. 
Of course we couldn't have done this without the help of a range of people: We owe a 
great deal of thanks to Dr. Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn for encouraging us and for sharing 
his views on our research agenda. We would also like to thank Hubert Buch-Hansen for 
invaluable critique on our preliminary drafts and working papers. We owe thanks to all 
the people who took the time for an interview ("you know who you are!” others 
interested in knowing who they are, see list of interviews!). We are also especially 
grateful to Mr. and Mrs. Bosteels for their kind hospitality and especially to Ivo for 
sharing his wisdom and ‘les fruits’ of a long life’s dedicated work. Thank you very 
much to the Hallberg/Borg family for delicious ‘Sønderjysk’ lunch, and to the Larsen 
family for almost lending us their house in Barr. Finally, a big thanks to our better 
halves (and Lille Sky) for putting up with our hogwash for another semester. None of 
these people should be held accountable for mistakes or errors that might have sneaked 
in to this report. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
Enjoy the reading! 
Magnus, Terkel, Måmor and Jakob 
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Abstract 
 
The gloomy prospects of demographic changes seem to have generated a pan-European 
conviction that public Pay-As-You-Go pension systems are unsustainable and 
subsequently need to be reformed if the European economy shall not be left in ruins. At 
the EU level, this problem has recently been incorporated in the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), which was an outcome of the ambitious 2000 Lisbon Agenda that 
seeks to achieve the objective of making Europe the most competitive economy in the 
world. This project scrutinizes the ideological character of the OMC of pensions, and 
seeks to trace the competing political projects that have featured in the debate leading 
up to the launch of the OMC of pensions and how these political struggles have been 
manifested in the design of the OMC of pensions. By applying a critical neo-Gramscian 
analysis, the project concludes that the OMC of pensions is deeply rooted in a neo-
liberal ideology that seeks to create a new European order in which social protection are 
enforced by the logic – and justice – of the self-regulating market.  
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1 Introduction 
 
At present, pensions are part of the public debate in almost all the EU member states. 
Reforms are on almost every politician’s lips and in many countries, special expert 
committees have been formed to come up with new solutions of how to arrange the 
pension systems and ‘save the welfare state’1. What seems to be the common reasoning 
is that all the countries more or less face the same future demographic changes. The 
changes can be divided into three main factors: Firstly, an increase in generations 
reaching the age of pension; Secondly, an increase in life expectancy; and thirdly, a 
decrease in birth-rates since the 1970s. In other words; a growing share of the 
populations are retiring with a decreasing share of populations in the workforce to 
support the increasing time as pensioners.2 This will obviously increase the public 
spending on the so-called pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, which briefly are 
pensions financed by general taxation. The pension debate has also reached the 
European level. Perhaps this was in fact really, where the debate gained momentum. 
The debate concerning the matter of the future of European pension systems took centre 
stage in 1995, when the influential Federal Trust3 published the report The Pensions 
Timebomb in Europe. In it, the Federal Trust pointed to the current demographic 
developments that would allegedly cause public PAYG pension schemes to indebt 
member states beyond the acceptable. The answer to the puzzle, according to the 
Federal Trust, was a new partnership between public pension schemes and private 
                                                 
 
1 E.g. in Denmark ’Velfærdskommissionen’ (The Welfare Commission) has been set up to come up with 
solutions for ensuring the future welfare, leading to major public debates as well as proposals for welfare 
reforms. 
2 The “Joint report by the Commission and the Council on Adequate and sustainable pensions” expects 
the EU population to live four to five years longer by year 2050. Furthermore the EPC report “Budgetary 
challenges posed by ageing populations” from October 2001 concludes that in year 2000 the average 
remaining life expectancy after retiring at the age of 65 is around 15 ½ years for men and 19 ½ for 
women. With an increase of 5 years the cost of maintaining the same level of public funded pensions will 
increase by 25 to 30 percent. Combined with the factor of decreasing birth-rates the old-age dependency 
ratio (the number of population aged 65+ in relation the working-age population between 15 and 64). In 
2000 the old-age dependency ratio in the EU was about 25%, in 2050 it’s presumed to be almost 50% - 
presumptions that indicates a shift from having 4 to only 2 persons in the workforce for every retired 
person 
3 The Federal Trust is a London-based think tank, founded in 1945 on the initiative of Sir William 
Beveridge – who is by many considered to be the father of the British welfare state.  
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funded pensions across Europe, where it favours partial deregulation of pensions across 
the European Union and liberalisation of pension funds across borders (Federal Trust 
2001). The concerns were later echoed in reports by the OECD and the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), who argued strongly for keeping the public 
pensions sustainable, by shifting from PAYG to funded schemes. It is therefore fair to 
say that the European debate evolved around a discourse of change. In other words there 
was indeed a consensus that something had to be done.   
1.1 THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE COMMISSION 
The European Commission responded to this request - or opportunity - in 1997, as it 
published a Green Paper titled: Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market. Here the 
Commission opened the discussion of how supplementary funded pensions should be 
integrated into the single market, while cautiously stressing that it did not wish to 
interfere in the Member States’ handling of their public funded pension systems. The 
Commission was aware - due to past experiences - that it would have to approach this in 
a careful manner. In 1994 it proposed a directive that – implicitly – provided for more 
liberalisation of pension fund management. The Directive was withdrawn after heavy 
pressure. The European Court of Justice (C-57/95) annulled a subsequent and similar 
Communication, as it would impose new binding obligations on Member States. The 
Commission, however, remained focussed on its past attempts: 
The Commission believes the objectives of the withdrawn Directive and the 
Communication still need to be pursued, in a broader context: in fact all the more so in 
view of the increasing awareness of the need to reform pension systems with a view to 
ensuring their sustainability. 
Commission (1997) 
In other words, the demographic challenges – and thereby the sustainability issue – 
remained paramount, and in the following years the question of pension reforms were 
put on almost each and every government and media agenda in Europe. However, it was 
clear that the Commission had to use other methods than ‘hard’ legislation such as 
directives and regulations. The pension area was, a crucial part of the sovereign identity 
of the member states, and thus simply too sensitive to - at least formally – give the EU 
competencies on the matter. 
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1.2 THE OMC OF PENSIONS  
It was out of this historical context that the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) of 
pensions evolved. The OMC of pensions is a ‘soft’ governance method adopted by the 
EU, which enables the member states and the Commission to compare the national 
pension systems and establish some common objectives to work on. Therefore it was 
obviously easier for the member states to accept, as it involved no binding legislation. 
The short history of the OMC of pensions began at the Laeken European Council in 
December 2001. Here the member states agreed on 11 objectives which were 
formulated in a Joint Report by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the Social 
Protection Committee (SPC). The 11 objectives deal with three principles on 
sustainability, modernisation and adequacy. Based on the 11 objectives the member 
states should every third year make National Strategy Reports (NSR) evaluating the 
domestic work on the common goals for the pension area. The NSRs are then gathered 
by the Commission in a joint report that by means of various indicators emanated from 
the 11 objectives compares the national pension systems, and give the individual 
member states future challenges to perform better. The iterative procedure of periodic 
monitoring and peer review should facilitate finding the best practices, and thereby 
make mutual learning possible. The design of the process is illustrated in figure 1 (see 
next page).  
 
The process can be seen as a joint work between the member states and the Commission 
institutionalised in the EPC and SPC, which consist of government representatives from 
the relevant departments and Commission representatives from the Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affaires (DG ECFIN) and Directorate General for 
Employment and Social Affairs (DG EMPL) which coordinate the work. As it is an area 
where the EU has no formal competencies, there is no legislation involved. Hence the 
decisions and implementation - i.e. the means to reach the objectives – lie exclusively at 
the member states' authority. In addition the European Court of Justice has no influence 
whatsoever and the European Parliament is only being informed about the process. 
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Objectives and Indicators 
- Drafted by EPC and SPC 
- Approved by the EU Council 
- Briefing to the European Parliament 
 
National Strategy Reports 
- Provided by the member states 
 
 
Joint Report 
- Drafted by the Commission 
- Discussed with the member states in the EPC 
and SPC  
- Briefing to the European Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Follow-up Stage: National Reforms 
- Decisions and implementation by the member 
states 
 
 
Figure 1 The design of the OMC of pensions, Inspired by Eckardt (2005: 15) 
 
1.3 CONCURRENT PROCESSES IN THE EU 
Even though the Commission failed in the establishment of the above mentioned 
directive, other EU processes indirectly affected – and affect - the national pension 
systems. The adoption of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) stranded the 
national authority of pension systems, by posing limits on public deficits, and through 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that seeks to maintain a balance in the public 
finances. These policies put pressure on the public pensions as they are a major part of 
the national budgets. The objectives of the OMC of pensions are subordinated to the 
EMU and SGP, and hence it is important to include these in the ‘picture’.  
Another concurrent process is the creation of the internal market based on the four 
freedoms of labour, capital, goods and services. As indicated above this process on 
pensions were stagnating in mid 90s. However, at the same time the OMC of pensions 
was established, the Commission resumed the work on pensions’ role in relation to the 
internal market. In 2003 the Council adopted a directive concerning institutions for 
occupational retirement provision, which aimed at removing barriers to cross boarder 
activities for pension funds (directive 2003/41/EC), and in 2005 a proposal was ready 
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for a directive for improving the portability of supplementary pension rights 
(Commission 2005b). The directives in that way seek to reduce the obstacles to the 
mobility of workers and thereby increase labour market flexibility4.  
In sum the OMC of pensions is by no means the only EU process, which has the 
potential of affecting the national pension systems. However without neglecting the 
other processes, our focus is on the history and institutional setup of the OMC of 
pensions.  
1.4 THE AIM OF THIS STUDY 
This project seeks to understand how and why the issue of pension systems has arisen in 
the EU and finally institutionalised in the OMC of pensions. There are indeed no simple 
answers to these questions and hence we will argue that a search for one causal 
explanation would be impossible and lead nowhere. The development is an outcome of 
a vast number of factors, which together has made this – at first sight – rather surprising 
and unique integration process possible. The public pension schemes are one of the 
cornerstones of the European welfare states, so the EU is now approaching an area, only 
a minority would have thought possible in the early days of the community. The 
immediate question in mind would then be, why have the member states agreed to let 
others get involved in some of their ‘crown jewels’? Even though there are no hard law 
involved in the process, one should not underestimate the potential effects of the 
development. The process implies that member states now for the first time allow others 
– the Commission and the other member states – to be involved in the redistributional 
policies in the welfare states. This is ground-breaking and from a narrow inter-
governmentalist focus on member state’s interests very hard to explain. One explanation 
could be that all member state governments agree in the same pension system solutions 
and reforms and therefore easily could define what the ‘best practice’ is. However, this 
statement can be contested. Even though the ‘European social model’ is often 
mentioned as a coherent entity, the European welfare states have huge dissimilarities 
and hence have different perceptions on how to arrange the pension systems. Therefore, 
although the European welfare states are exposed to roughly the same demographic 
changes, it is unlikely that the member states will tackle the changes in the same 
                                                 
 
4 See e.g. ’grounds for and objectives for the proposal’ in (Commission 2005b) 
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manner. In sum, the demand for reforms due to demographic changes cannot be the sole 
explanation to initiate a process as time-consuming and complex as the OMC of 
pensions.  
 
This indicates that part of the explanation to the development shall be found outside the 
member states. Someone or something else must have pulled the development towards 
the EU. A supra-nationalist answer to this question could be the Commission. Most 
scholars agree that the Commission in previous processes such as the Single European 
Act has played a role in driving the integration process further, so the Commission 
could be the place to look and find the answer. However as already indicated, the 
Commission was in a very weak position in the end of the 90s, and therefore it is 
doubtful that it would have had the backing to initiate the OMC of pensions out of their 
own initiative. 
Still, even if the Commission as an actor was weak at the time, there is no doubt that the 
institutional capacities of the EU have eased the initiation of the process. Before the 
OMC of pensions was established, the institutional framework – i.e. the OMC – was 
already working in other areas such as employment policy. The reasons for this lie in 
the so-called European Employment Strategy (EES) which started in 1997. Through the 
EES the EU adopted the ‘soft’ governance mode that was later to be used on pensions. 
The member states agreed to create National Action Plans (NAP) and to be monitored 
and assessed by the method of benchmarking formulating policy ‘guidelines’ and 
‘recommendations’ (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 178). In 2000 at the Lisbon summit this new 
(at least in the EU) method of governance was integrated and institutionalised in a larger 
and ambitious framework. The European Council agreed on “a new strategic goal for 
the next decade: to become the most competitive and most knowledge-based economy in 
the world”, which was to be known as the Lisbon Strategy (Council 2000). The strategy 
was formulated as a response to globalisation and the shift to knowledge-driven 
economies in the EU. To reach these very ambitious goals the EU ‘invented’ the Open 
Method of Coordination, which adopted the governance tools already in use in the EES. 
The OMC should be applied in various areas where the EU had no formal competencies 
such as social security and innovation policy; and a year later the pension area was also 
included. The OMC of pensions can therefore both be seen as an attempt to make the 
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EU members more competitive in the global context, and as an attempt to somehow 
tackle some future demographic challenges. However, we will argue that these are only 
functional and superficial explanations. To explain why the OMC of pensions was 
created, we have to understand how competitiveness and demography have become a 
matter for the EU. As we have argued the answers cannot solely be traced to the main 
actors at the EU level - neither the member states nor the Commission.  
1.5 OMC OF PENSIONS FROM A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
An alternative aspect we will emphasise lies at the ideational level. An aspect 
overlooked or underestimated by most studies of the field. Competitiveness is an 
attractive and at first sight positive loaded word, in the sense that it is good to be 
competitive. However when we look at the content of the word it is not at all evident 
what it refers to. The concept of competitiveness is normally used in relation to 
companies’ performance and it is highly arguable whether this corporate logic can be 
transferred to the realm of national states. Hence, a way to understand why 
competitiveness has been an important issue in the EU, is to look at the discourse of 
competitiveness and the actors involved in the ‘shaping’ and the struggle of the 
discourse. The same goes for the issue of globalisation, which is also a commonly used 
word in many contemporary debates. Even though globalisation is related to some 
incontestable changes - such as the growing importance of information technology -, the 
impact of, and the solutions to the changes, are highly contested and articulated very 
differently. Hence political struggles are also a struggle of defining these words in a 
way that corresponds to the interests of the actors involved. For example if 
competitiveness is defined as national states’ ability to attract mobile capital, protective 
measures against globalisation are no longer an option (cf. Van Apeldoorn 2002: 176). 
Thus the way ‘competitiveness’ is defined and articulated in the Lisbon Strategy 
matters, because it favours some interests at the expense of others.  
We believe that the discourse of competitiveness and the articulation of the 
demographic changes have been central to the development and content of the OMC of 
pensions. We have therefore chosen a constructivist approach to our project. The 
constructivist approach thus recognizes the fundamental significance of ideational 
factors such as norms, discourses and identity etc. in political processes. As it 
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acknowledges that institutions are in the end socially constructed, it does not believe in 
a certain telos. There is no such thing as an essence of the ideal society, and even if 
there is, it is beyond our knowledge. The idea of an ideal societal arrangement is 
consequently a utopia, as it always will be grounded in certain normative 
understandings of how to arrange the society i.e. it will be grounded in a certain 
ideology. The idea of a ‘best practising’ pension system can therefore never be objective 
and free of ideology. Hence we will not consider the idea of benchmarks as a way to 
achieve the best practices, but as a way to institutionalise a specific ideological view on 
society. We therefore look at political institutions e.g. the EU and the OMC of pensions 
as outcomes of political struggles of social actors, favouring some ideological stances at 
the expense of others. This is crucial, as the OMC of pensions is presented – both by the 
Commission and most scholars – as a strictly technical and thereby an apolitical 
process. It can also be regarded as problematic from a democratic point of view as the 
European Parliament (EP) is excluded form the process (cf. figure 1), and hence there is 
no direct democratic control with the process.  
The EU is thus not to be regarded as a ‘neutral site’, but as an institutional setup which 
has a specific social purpose (cf. Van Apeldoorn 2002: 12). The social purpose can be 
defined as the ideological content which favours some interests at the expense of others. 
Analysing the social purpose makes it possible to trace the origins and driving forces of 
the process in focus. It is thereby a way to understand how ideological discourses, social 
actors and institutions interplay.  
We will argue that it is misleading to consider the OMC of pensions as a positive-sum 
game where everybody wins. The OMC of pensions is – despite its technical 
appearance - like any other political process a result of political struggles involving 
winners as well as losers. Understanding the social purpose is an unavoidable 
component to explain how and why the OMC of pensions has evolved. Hence when the 
OMC of pensions claims to include the aspect of social protection, the immediate 
question is not only how but in fact more who is it protecting? I.e. which social actors 
actually benefit the most from this process? 
We will approach this, by examining the competing political projects in the European 
field of pensions. A focus on the political projects will illuminate the relation between 
the social actors’ interests and the political issues at stake. We will later identify a neo-
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liberal and a social democratic project in the European field of pensions, and use these 
as ideal types for further analysis. We will examine the competing projects in a period 
of 11 years – from 1995 to April 2006. Hence, our analysis seeks to answer how the 
issue of pensions has arisen in the EU. The following question will guide our study: 
 
How are competing political projects reflected in the debate of European pension 
reforms and how is this struggle manifested in the design of the OMC of pensions? 
 
This will open for the deeper question: 
Why was the OMC of pensions created? 
         
To answer these questions we have chosen to make an analysis grounded in neo-
Gramscian theory. As the neo-Gramscian theory also dictates our method, we will give 
a detailed account of our choice of theory, before we begin our analysis. After the 
introduction to our theory we thus account for our strategy of analysis. 
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2 The neo-Gramscian approach – a theoretical 
framework 
 
The neo-Gramscian approach is a fairly new research agenda in the studies of 
International Relations (IR) beginning in the 1980s and providing a constructivist 
alternative to – and critique of - the dominant positivist paradigm within International 
relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE). The neo-Gramscian approach 
is an alternative to both the metatheory (rationalism and the alleged objectivity) and the 
theory (the narrow focus on form - which we will get back to) of the dominant 
paradigm. The Gramscian approach was introduced to the study of IPE and IR primarily 
by Robert Cox in 1981, and has since provided thorough critique of the prevailing 
positivist paradigm within mainstream IR (Hobden and Jones 2001: 211). Neo-
Gramscian analyses have almost been non-existing in European integration studies. 
However, in the beginning of the 21st century a growing number of scholars have used 
Gramscian theory analysing in particular the role of transnational actors in EU processes 
(see Van Apeldoorn 2002 and Bieler & Morton (eds.) 2001). The neo-Gramscian theory 
reintroduces the thinking and concepts of the Italian communist and philosopher 
Antonio Gramsci, among others using his concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘historic bloc’.  
The theory has profound roots in Marxist theory, however rejecting the deterministic 
nature of its mechanical, structuralist and teleological viewpoints.  
In the following, we will argue, why we find the neo-Gramscian approach relevant and 
necessary – both as an alternative to positivist approaches, but also as an alternative to 
other constructivist approaches within the studies of European integration. We will start 
the chapter with a meta-theoretical discussion of the ontology and epistemology in the 
approach. Afterwards, we will introduce the analytical concepts of Antonio Gramsci 
and subsequently apply them to the field of IR and EU-studies. Finally we will set up 
the framework for the succeeding analysis.  
2.1 ONTOLOGY – THE DIALECTICAL BASE 
In the following, we will introduce the ontology of neo-Gramscianism based on the two 
fundamental dualisms in the meta-theories of social sciences: the relations between 
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structure vs. agency and the material vs. the ideological. 
Structure and Agency  
If one word could encapsulate the metatheory of the neo-Gramscian approach, it would 
be dialectic. The word implies that two aspects affect each other. In this sense dialectic 
is opposed to the word causality that implies a unidirectional impact (we will return to 
this later).  
This is first apparent in the ontological relation between structure and agency, which has 
been termed the ‘historical necessity’ (Gill 1993: 22). ”Although social action is 
constrained by, and constituted within, prevailing social structures, those structures are 
transformed by agency” (ibid: 23). Thus, within the dialectical relation between 
structure and agency lies both the explanation for inertia and change. Structural change 
can only happen within the ‘limits of the possible’, which are nevertheless changeable 
by human agency (ibid: 23). Therefore social action is always conditioned – and never 
determined – by the structures. 
Hence, when it comes to the structure/agency relation it is obvious that the neo-
Gramscian theory has many similarities with the assumptions in the critical realist 
paradigm among others formulated by Roy Bhaskar in his ‘transformational model of 
activity’ and by Anthony Giddens in his concept of ‘structurationist’. (cf. Van 
Apeldoorn 2002: 15)  
The material and the ideational 
As seen above, the metatheory of neo-Gramscianism can be said to be within a larger 
constructivist stream of thought. However, the neo-Gramscian theory diverges on 
important points from other constructivist theories such as sociological institutionalism 
and (post-structuralist) discourse theory. The cardinal point of distinction is its roots in 
Marxist economic theory. This is clear in the neo-Gramscian emphasis and viewpoint 
on the material aspect of the social structure. The ‘material’ is from this Marxist 
viewpoint the ‘relations of production’. The social organisation of capitalist production 
has divided the people into different classes – capitalists and workers, which have 
different interests and hence struggle for power. (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 18-19)   
However, contrary to some orthodox Marxist thinking, the Neo-Gramscian theory holds 
that the social structure also has an ideational dimension, which is constituted by laws, 
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rules, norms, etc. Thus, the traditional causal relation in Marxism - saying that the base 
(economy) determines the superstructure (political system, norms etc.) (Hobden and 
Jones 2001: 204) - is abandoned (Gill 1993: 38). Instead, the material and ideational 
dialectically presupposes each other. The economy, the society and the political are 
hence closely interrelated and interdependent, which makes it necessary to analyse the 
social world in its totality (Hobden and Jones 2001: 204). This is precisely formulated 
by Cox:  
The juxtaposition and reciprocal relationships of the political, ethical and ideological 
spheres of activity with the economic sphere avoids reductionism. (…) In Gramsci’s 
historical materialism (…), ideas and material conditions are always bound together, 
mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to be 
understood in relation to material circumstances. Material circumstances include both 
the social relations and the physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology 
and political organisation shape the development of both aspects of production and are 
shaped by them.  
Cox 1993a: 56 
Acknowledging the complexity and interdependency of social processes, simple causal 
explanations become unsatisfactory and the traditional methodological distinction in 
social sciences between independent and dependent variables becomes problematic. In 
studies of social processes, one should instead look at what Gramsci called ‘historic 
blocs’, which are “the organic fit between material conditions, ideas and institutional 
practices.” (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 20, our emphasis). Empirically, this indicates that a 
historic bloc is the relations between the state and social forces in the economy and 
society (Gill 1993: 39-40). We have attempted to illustrate this in figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2 The historic bloc, inspired by figure in Johansen (2001: 90) 
 
The concept of historic bloc also implies that the traditional disciplinary dividing lines 
between political science and economy are arbitrary and misleading as the two are 
intertwined, and hence one has to include both aspects to understand the societal 
processes. 
2.2 EPISTEMOLOGY – THE CRITICAL APPROACH 
The dialectic characteristic goes on in the epistemology of neo-Gramscianism. In neo-
Gramscianism ontology and epistemology are closely intertwined, meaning that the 
researcher cannot study the unit of analysis objectively from the outside. This is 
encapsulated by Robert Cox in the often-quoted saying that “theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1995: 31, his emphasis), and thus becomes part 
of the historical process. This implies a rejection of the positivist division between 
subject and object (Gill 1993: 24).  
The referred epistemological assumption makes it possible to distinguish between two 
types of theories: ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’. The problem solving theories take the 
world for given and seek only to correct dysfunctions or solve specific problems within 
the existing order. They thus have an underlying aim at maintaining the existing 
structures as they are. In contrast, critical theories are concerned with how the existing 
order came into being and the possibilities and strategies for changing the order. (Cox 
1995: 31-32). The neo-Gramscian theories fall under the latter, and thus acknowledge 
being part of the historical process and therefore never completely objective. The 
dichotomy logically also imply a critique of existing theories on IR and IPE – and 
mainly neo-realism, neo-liberalism and neo-classical economic theory – which is seen 
as promoting a particular world order, even though they somehow claim to be objective. 
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The same critique can also be applied to the theories of European integration, which we 
will do in the following.    
 
The neo-Gramscian approach within IR is in many ways a radical alternative to the 
existing theories within the field of EU-studies. Since the foundation of the EC and until 
recently, the process of European integration has been analysed from scholars grounded 
in the studies of IR. The question of the dynamics of - and explanations to - the unique 
European integration have been analysed and debated within the theories of inter-
governmentalism and neo-functionalism. The theories have discussed the driving 
mechanisms of European integration emphasising either states or supranational actors 
such as the Commission as the catalysts of integration. In other words, the ‘schools’ 
have focused on the question of, whether sovereignty-transfer from nation-states to 
supranational institutions is happening. The debate have close parallels to the IR debate 
between neo-realists and neo-liberalists, in general terms discussing the sovereignty of 
nation-states and the functioning of international institutions (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 34-
35). In this sense, the debates within IR and EU have only focussed on state power i.e. 
the form of the international order. What is missing is the dimension of content meaning 
‘the social purpose’, which a narrow focus on power does not catch. (Van Apeldoorn 
2002: 12) 
A particular order, e.g. the European order, will always serve a particular social 
purpose. The form and content of an international order are intertwined and thus affects 
each other in dialectical ways (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 12). This implies that the process 
of European integration should be viewed, not only as a question of whether nation-
states loose sovereignty, but as much as a question of how and why these structural 
changes are connected to particular socio-economic interests and purposes.  
2.3 THE NEO-GRAMSCIAN THEORY5 
Following the meta-theoretical discussion, we are now ready to introduce the theory of 
neo-Gramscianism – i.e. we will discuss the explanatory attributes of the theory relating 
to the fundamental issues in social science: social action, social structure and social 
                                                 
 
5 We are aware that it is a simplifying act to speak of only one neo-Gramscian theory. However, we find 
no antagonisms in the different concepts and assumptions our framework is based on. 
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change. In the subsequent, we will mainly focus on the two most famous Gramscian 
concepts – ‘historic bloc’ and ‘hegemony’.  
The concept of ‘hegemony’ is central to understand how Gramsci radically reinterpreted 
Marxism. Again, the dialectical interplay between the material and ideational is central. 
According to Marx, the ones who owned and controlled the means of production 
constituted the ruling class. Gramsci’s view on social structure, which was derived 
from empirical observations, makes this assumption inadequate.6 The ideational aspect 
is simply absent. Instead, he developed the concept hegemony, which was inspired by 
Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli described power using the metaphor of a centaur – 
half man and half beast – thus, power is a necessary combination of consent and 
coercion, and as long as the consensual aspect stands in the forefront, hegemony 
prevails (Cox 1993a:52). 
In Gramscian theory ‘hegemony’ is connected with the power of social classes. Hence, 
it is not sufficient for a class to own and control the means of production to gain 
hegemony. Some ‘control’ over the minds of people is needed as well.  
In its most fundamental and complete sense, however, the achievement of hegemony is 
concerned with the transcendence of narrowly based economic and corporate 
perspectives, so that a genuinely universal position, synthesising particular with 
general interests, could come to prevail.  
Gill 1993: 40, our emphasis 
So if a social class has the "capacity to claim with credibility" (Gill 1993: 42) that its 
interest is also the universal interest, it has the chance to gain hegemony.  However, 
hegemony can never be absolute or in other words ‘Orwellian’7. This is due to agency 
and human being having consciousness and a degree of free will to act (within the limits 
of the possible). Hence, attempts to create hegemony will always tend to generate 
                                                 
 
6 Gramsci’s main problem was to understand, why revolution did not occur in the industrialised Western 
Europe, as Marxist theory had predicted. To explain this he had to recognise the consensual power of 
norms, cultural values, etc. which were key factors in sustaining the social order. (Hobden and Jones 
2001: 210) 
7 We hereby refer to the novel ’Nineteen Eighty-four’ by George Orwell. Here, Orwell describes a 
hermetically closed system of hegemony, using the means of consent as well as coercion. Here in the so-
called Oceania even the resistance movement is created by the ruling the party INGSOC to pick up and 
pacify possible rebellious souls. The system therefore seems – in our interpretation – to be impossible to 
circumvent as it assimilates and destroys all counter-hegemonic attempts.  
  
 
 
 
16
counter-hegemonic social forces (Gill 1993: 43).  
 
The construction of hegemony implies the building of a historic bloc. A historic bloc 
cannot exist without a hegemonic social class (Cox 1993a:56). Above, we introduced 
historic bloc as an ontological concept that describes the interplay between the material 
and the ideational, and structure and agency. However, in this context historic bloc 
works as a historical concept and ideal type that describes some nexuses in the capitalist 
society. A historic bloc is therefore the way the hegemony is embedded in the various 
structures of society (a specific form of state) and expressed in ideologies, and how 
other social classes become embedded in these structures.  
For Gramsci the role of intellectuals is crucial to build a historic bloc. The intellectuals 
develop and sustain “the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind 
together the members of a class and of a historic bloc into a common identity" (Cox 
1993a: 57). This also relates to the neo-Gramscian critique of the dominant positivist 
paradigm in IR and IPE, which is seen as promoting a particular hegemony, and 
therefore is part of a historic bloc (see e.g. Gill 1993).    
In order to remain hegemonic, social classes can assimilate potentially dangerous ideas 
and interests by adjusting them to the hegemonic discourse, however, still in such a way 
that they are subordinated to the interests of the hegemonic class (Cox 1993a: 55). 
Before a class can articulate a universal discourse, it needs to be aware of its collective 
position and interests. This leads us to the issue of class formation.    
Class is a dual concept in the sense that it has a structural as well as an agency aspect. 
First, class is grounded in "the specific distribution of the conditions of action inherent 
in capitalist production relations and to the social positions emanating from that 
distribution" (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 22). However, the structural conditions does not 
create a conscious class in it self. Class agency first happens "when some men, as a 
result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of 
their interests as between themselves, and against other men whose interests are 
different from (and usually opposed to) theirs." (E. P. Thompson in Apeldoorn 2002: 
21). Thus, ‘class agency’ presupposes some structural conditions as well as some degree 
of class consciousness. The concept also incorporates some degree of rational choice 
into the theory. If the class is ‘conscious’, it behaves strategically within the limits of 
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the possible, pursuing its interests, which are shaped - but not determined by the 
material relations of production (Apeldoorn 2002: 22).    
In addition to the discussion of classes it is important to emphasise that change is 
always caused by social actors through political struggles. Hence, returning to the base-
superstructure dualism, Gramscian theory argues - contrary to Marxism - that the 
economy is ultimately politically structured (Torfing 1990: 179). This is why the focus 
of Gramscian analyses is mainly at the political level i.e. the level of political struggles, 
because this always will be the place where changes happen.   
2.4 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE EU IN A NEO-
GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Now that we have introduced the most important concepts of neo-Gramscian theory, it 
is relevant to see, what it can explain in our field of research – the study of the socio-
economic struggles in the EU. 
When one intend to apply neo-Gramscian theory on the study of international 
institutions the global social relations of production becomes crucial for an 
understanding of the processes. Since the 1970s a transformation in western capitalist 
societies has been taken place moving from Keynesianism towards neo-liberalism at the 
ideational level (Bieler and Morton 2003: 4), promoting especially certain transnational 
actors. This restructuring of global capitalism constructing a potential new hegemonic 
world order with new universal norms, shapes the form and content of international 
institutions such as the EU (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 1-2). 
Cox proposes five ways in which the world order is expressed in international 
institutions: First, international institutions “embody the rules which facilitate the 
expansion of hegemonic world orders”. Second, they ”are themselves the product of the 
hegemonic world order”. International institutions have an informal structure of 
influence that reflects the socio-economic powers which underlie the formal procedures 
for decisions. Third, international institutions ”ideologically legitimate the norms of the 
world order” by for example defining the policy guidelines for the states and by 
legitimising certain institutions and practices at the national level. Fourth, they ”co-opt 
the elites from peripheral countries”. Finally, they assimilate counter-hegemonic ideas 
and make these ideas compatible with the interests and ideology of the hegemonic 
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order. (Cox 1993a: 62-63)  
Helle Johansen has criticised this view from a constructivist standpoint drawing on Bob 
Jessop, for tending to be too economic deterministic and materialistic, especially when 
it is applied to the EU. Even though the framework emphasises the ideational and the 
agency dimension, the neo-Gramscians empirically end up mainly focussing on the 
material dimension i.e. social classes and the relations of production. Hence, Neo-
Gramscians tend to view the EU as a ‘transmission belt’ and thus only as an expression 
of the global relations of production - and at the present time the neo-liberal world 
order. By doing so, they risk to overlook and/or devaluate the distinct political, cultural 
and historical dynamics of Europe and the EU. (Johansen 2001) 
It is not only the actors constituted around the principle of social class that matters in a 
form of state like the EU. The ‘institutional ensemble’ or the polity of the EU matters, 
because it has a specific ‘strategic selectivity’ which affects the access to influence, the 
mode of operation and therefore the concrete policies (Johansen 2001: 111-112). In 
other words, the polities of the EU inherently favour some political projects at the 
expense of others (Ibid: 119).  
EU politics are not only about socioeconomic matters and, hence, issues of state 
sovereignty and actors like the Commission should – if relevant - be included in the 
analysis. Johansen’s point is that one cannot take the relation between the social 
relations of production and the social actors and the institutions for granted and thereby 
risk being class-reductionist.  
In sum, the EU can be seen as having a ‘double character’ as it both is ”a relatively 
autonomous site and an institutional configuration, within which various and competing 
answers to global trends evolve” (Johansen 2001: 106, her emphasis). The relations 
between the units of analysis should therefore in stead be an empirical question to 
examine. A way to avoid class reductionism is to focus on competing political projects 
in the field of study (see e.g. Van Apeldoorn 2002 and Johansen 2001). Through a focus 
on the struggle between European political projects, the impact of the global order is 
more an open hypothesis than a precondition for the concrete study. We will return to 
this analytical problem in the next chapter.  
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2.5 THE FIELD OF ANALYSIS – THE NEO-GRAMSCIAN APPROACH AND 
EXISTING RESEARCH 
As mentioned above the neo-Gramscian approach provides a radical alternative to the 
‘traditional’ theories of European integration. However the studies of the EU have 
during the last 10-15 years taken an ‘ontological turn’ somehow leaving the old debate 
about the explanation(s) of the process of integration; instead, the mainstream studies 
now focus on the potential outcomes and effects i.e. ‘the nature of the beast’ as Thomas 
Risse in 1996 termed it. The post neo-functionalist vs. inter-governmentalist agenda 
seeks to conceptualise the EU as a political form, thus moving from specific theories 
about European integration grounded in IR to the discipline of comparative politics 
(Johansen 2001: 40-41). 
The new agenda has included aspects of the socio-economic content of the integration 
process, e.g. through studies of (multi level) governance, which have looked at policy 
networks and the role of interest groups. However, even though these studies offer 
thorough accounts of the processes in themselves, they tend to be vague in their 
explanations of the origins of the processes. (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 41-42). Our neo-
Gramscian theory - we argue - provides the study of the integration processes with a 
more applicable framework to understand not only how the process is, but also why it is 
as it is. In this way the neo-Gramscian approach revitalises the old debate, however with 
a very different theoretical understanding that among other things acknowledges the 
relevance of the social relations of production. Hence, our study by means of the neo-
Gramscian ‘glasses’ combines the why question from the old debate, with the how 
question from the new agenda, thereby moving beyond the question whether the EU 
should be studied with either IR/IPE theories or theories deriving from comparative 
politics. In our view, the neo-Gramscian approach - even though it is most often placed 
in the discipline of IPE – should be thought of as a hybrid between the IPE discipline 
and comparative politics. One of the main points drawn from the neo-Gramscian studies 
is that the explanations of e.g. the European integration process, lies inherent in the 
relations between the global, regional and national levels. Therefore it is necessary to 
dissolve the disciplinary borderlines and combine the insights produced from both. In so 
doing, we will be able to explore – not only the nature of the beast, but also the colour 
of the beast (cf. Johansen 2001).  
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Another potential alternative to the mainstream approaches in EU studies is the one of 
social constructivism. The research agenda is very promising, delivering important 
insights of the normative and discoursive effects of the EU on identities and behaviour 
of states and other social actors. Thomas Risse identifies three ways in which social 
constructivism can contribute to the understanding of the EU. The issues are a better 
understanding of 1) Europeanisation through the accept of the mutual constitutiveness 
of structure and agency; 2) how European law, rules and policies shapes identities and 
interests; and 3) how Europe and the EU are discursively constructed through a focus on 
communicative practices. (Risse 2004: 165-166). The understandings of social 
constructivism are obviously very beneficial to a neo-Gramscian analysis; e.g. 
providing a better understanding of the consensual side of hegemony. However, based 
on Risse’s research agenda it is evident that social constructivism does not relate the 
normative understandings with the socio-economic dimension.    
 
The academic shift mentioned above towards a focus on the political form is clearly 
reflected in the existing literature on the OMC. The OMC as such has attracted attention 
from many scholars rooted in both political science and law.  The scholars have focused 
on issues of democracy (see De la Porte and Nanz 2003), new forms of governance (see 
e.g. Radaelli 2003, Borras and Greve 2004, Schäfer 2006, and Trubek & Mosher 2001) 
governance effectiveness (Scharpf 2002, Radaelli 2004 and Eckardt 2005) and lastly 
from a Europeanisation perspective (Featherstone 2005). All the studies (perhaps except 
the Europeanisation study) are within this ‘second wave’ of EU studies, which focus on 
‘the nature of the beast’. Thus there are yet no studies that have looked for the deeper 
explanations to the rise of the OMC of pensions and the OMC in general such as global 
processes and general changes in discourse. Pochet looks at the European pension area 
more as a whole, and thereby catches some of the system’s ‘strategic selectivity’ (cf. 
Pochet 2003 and Pochet and Natali 2004). However he never put on the critical glasses 
and therefore his analysis remains at the descriptive level.   
Another key to understand the process lies at the overall ideational level, which implies 
issues of discourse and ideology. This issue is also absent, in the existing research on 
the OMC (an exception is Haahr 2004, see chapter 10). Ideology is in our approach 
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expressed in different political projects for Europe, that actors use to combine and 
articulate their interests with the universal interest in the struggle for hegemony (Van 
Apeldoorn 2003: 147). The study of these ideological struggles is a cardinal point in 
understanding the relation between the social relations of production and the social 
actors i.e. the historic bloc.    
In sum the EU studies in general - and the OMC studies – are in need of more critical 
approaches to search for and illuminate the ideological content and social purpose of the 
European integration processes. The EU should not be seen as neutral political system, 
which can be studied with neutral glasses. The EU should be studied as a ‘coloured’ 
system with a specific ‘strategic selectivity’ sanctioning a certain ‘social purpose’. 
Through this chapter we have argued that a way to bring back the socio-economic issue 
and ideology into the EU studies is to make use of neo-Gramscian theory.  
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3 Method and the plan of the analysis 
 
We are now ready to illustrate how we intend to conduct our analysis. We will adopt a 
strategy of analysis similar of Van Apeldoorn’s research on the ERT’s influence on the 
EU (see 2002: 2). First, our neo-Gramscian analysis takes its starting point in the global 
and European political economy, meaning in general the changes in the social relations 
of production i.e. the changes in capitalism that we have briefly mentioned in chapter 5.  
Second, the empirical research of our project will analyse how these global and 
European changes in capitalism affect the process of European integration. This step 
consists of an actor oriented aspect and a structural aspect. The actor oriented aspect is 
to analyse how different social forces attempt to formulate hegemonic projects around 
certain ideas. The structural aspect is how these struggles institutionalises into a 
particular form of state i.e. polity – could be a national state or the EU; and in our case 
the OMC of pensions. Finally we will asses, how these tendencies will feed back to the 
social relations of production – in our case the European pension systems. The steps are 
not unidirectional in the sense that step 1 always causes step 2. All the steps are 
interrelated and affect each other (cf. section on metatheory and figure 3). However, 
when we conduct the analysis some separation will of course be needed. But still we 
will attempt to avoid the abovementioned neo-Gramscian pitfall of only seeing the EU 
as a symptom of the global order 
  
 
Figure 3 The units of analysis, inspired by figure in Johansen (2001: 91) 
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We will do this by making use of the critical realist method called ‘retroduction’. 
Retroduction is a way to circumvent the logical methodology inherent in both induction 
and deduction, which both are about how to reach conclusions from some premises. 
Induction infers from the particular premise to a general conclusion, whereas deduction 
infers from a general premise to a particular conclusion. (Buch-Hansen and Nielsen 
2005: 60f). Keeping this in mind, the critique of neo-Gramscian analyses can also be 
seen as a critique of the deductive method. If neo-Gramscians take the unidirectional 
impact of the global order for granted, they work deductively moving from the general 
premise of global neo-liberal hegemony to a particular conclusion about the form of 
state e.g. the EU.   
The retroductive method turns the deductive and the inductive line of reasoning upside 
down, as it takes its starting point in the conclusion. Taking the conclusion for granted, 
it seeks to trace the particular premises, “which by all accounts must exist to make this 
phenomenon/act possible” (Ibid: 61, our own translation8).  
We will use the retroductive method as a supplement to the fairly deductive two-step 
strategy proposed above. This implicates that even though we start our analysis at the 
global level, we will not see this as a determinant layer which alone causes the 
development in the EU. Instead we will derive some ideal types relating to different 
ideologies, which we will use later on to define the competing political projects in the 
EU - and in particular around the OMC of pensions. Thereby the deeper premises for 
the history and design of the OMC of pensions remain open. It is through the analysis of 
the social struggles and competing political projects around the OMC of pensions, and 
their links to the form of state of the OMC, we will be able to identify the underlying 
social purpose of the OMC of pensions. Thereby we can asses the impact of the global 
order against other possible premises.         
3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT  
The plan of the project will be as follows. In chapter 4 we will introduce the economic 
aspects of pension systems, including the three pillar typology that pensions are usually 
                                                 
 
8 The wording in Danish are as follows: “Der tages typisk udgangspunkt i et manifest fænomen eller en 
given handling (‘konklusionen’), og der peges på, hvilke nødvendige mulighedsbetingelser og dybe 
årsagssammenhænge, der efter alt at dømme må eksistere for, at dette fænomen/denne handling kan finde 
sted (‘præmissen’).” (Buch-Hansen and Nielsen 2005: 61) 
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characterised through. In this respect, risk and uncertainty are also important issues to 
understand.     
In chapter 5 we will introduce the global and European context, the OMC of pensions 
should be seen within. The neo-liberal tendencies in EU are not only a European matter. 
These relate to global processes and global changes in the political economy, often 
termed as globalisation. Here we try to dig below the level of discourse and try to 
examine what is actually happening with the global economy. The global changes have 
already had profound effects on the European capitalist economies. The changes have 
put pressure on the European welfare systems and caused changes, which Jessop (2004) 
have described as a move from a Keynesian welfare state towards a Schumpeterian 
workfare state. Finally, in this chapter we will asses how these neo-liberal and 
Schumpeterian streams relate to the pension systems, by setting up two theoretically 
grounded ideal types for  projects competing at the EU level for hegemony with regards 
to the design of pension systems. These two ideal types; the neo-liberal and the social 
democratic project, will be a theoretical stepping stone for our empirical analysis. 
This will lead over to the second step of the analysis – the analysis of the European 
integration process. Our empirical data consists of a long list of reports and statements 
from EU-institutions as well as from relevant interest groups and social actors. In order 
to give our analysis a firm empirical foundation we have also carried out a range of 
interviews with actors, whom we have found to be vital in the process, including 
Commission staff, member state representatives as well as other social actors or 
European lobbyists if you will.  
In chapter 6 we will make a brief historical examination of the role of the European 
Union in relation to the global and European changes mentioned above. Additionally we 
will emphasise the distinctive character of the polity in the EU. This will include a 
discussion of the ‘strategic selectivity’ and the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ (Scharpf 
2002) of EU and show how EU also could be seen as an expression of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ (Gill 1998). Furthermore we will look into the European patterns of 
network governance, interest representation and lobbying. This will make it clearer 
which social actors and groups have access to the policy-making in the EU. All these 
issues which define the institutional set-up of the EU - we will argue – are very 
important to understand how policies develop in the OMC of pensions. 
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In chapter 7 we will dig more into the OMC of pensions. We will start this historical 
examination with the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, and end it with the latest report from 
March 2006. Thus, this is an attempt to contextualise the development of the OMC of 
pensions and give a thorough account of the structure of as well as previous 
developments within the OMC of pensions. 
In chapter 8 we will empirically develop the neo-liberal and the social democratic 
projects mainly in regards to the pension issue. By giving an in-depth account of key 
actors and messages related to the two projects, we will later be able to assess the 
projects’ influence on the OMC of pensions.  
In chapter 9 we will make an analysis of the formal as well as informal modes of 
interaction around the OMC of pensions. EPC and SPC, are the central committees in 
the process, and the analysis asses who, how and why different social actors will be able 
to gain access to the committees and thereby implicitly or explicitly be able to influence 
the policy processes of the OMC of pensions.  
In chapter 10 we will asses the ‘social purpose’ of the polity and the policies of the 
OMC of pensions. This is done by assessing the governance method applied to the 
pension area in the EU; the OMC; and by assessing the specific content of the 
objectives and the indicators of the OMC of pensions.  
Finally in chapter 11 we will sum up all our findings and answer the two research 
questions we posed in the introduction. We will in particular compare the study of the 
political projects with our analysis of the actors’ access to the OMC of pensions 
(chapter 9) and the ‘social purpose’ of the OMC of pensions.  
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4 Pension Systems in an economic theoretical 
perspective 
 
4.1 EUROPEAN ORIGINS  
Pension systems, as we know them today, were initially created in Germany in the late 
1800s by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Established by law in 1889, the 
Bismarckian pension system provided pension for all workers in trade, industry and 
agriculture from the age of 70 (reduced to 65 in 1916) through capitalization of 
contributions by employer, employee and – in some cases – the State. The Bismarckian 
solution was the start of the so-called funded pension schemes, under which pensions 
are paid from a fund built up by contributions from its members.  
They are contrasted by the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) design that became popular after 
World War II, especially in the US where concern was voiced about the large 
accumulation of capital could de-stabilize the capital market (World Bank 2006: 62). 
The Beveridge Report (1942) was produced in the United Kingdom, which provided the 
foundation of the British Welfare State, and aided this development and created 
incentives for further PAYG-systems. In the Beveridge-system pensions are paid to 
protect the elderly against poverty following a flat-rate contribution, with little or no 
connection to past earnings. The direct aim of cash benefit systems such as these 
pension schemes was – and still is – poverty relief (Barr 2004: 16-35).  
4.2 THE DESIGN OF PENSION SYSTEMS 
As briefly touched upon above, there is no such thing as one pension system. They 
differ significantly. In order to approach them analytically, they must be categorized. 
From an economic standpoint, pensions can be separated by the benefits they promise 
and the way they finance that promise. There are two types of pension plans; a defined-
contribution (DC) and defined-benefit (DB). Financing methods can be either pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) or funded (OECD 2004). 
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Funded and PAYG systems 
In a funded system, pension funds are built up from contributions by members and/or 
their employers. Pension funds are typically invested into financial assets and upon 
retirement paid out to its members in an annuity.  
Pay-As-You-Go pension are typically run by the state. In this system, pensions are paid 
through general taxation; vertical redistribution, where the revenue from taxation is 
transferred to provide income for the elderly, who have been subject to the same 
principle, when participating in the workforce. In simple terms, PAYG are a mandatory 
transfer of money from the active workforce to the retired – an arrangement, under 
which current income is shared between coexisting generations of employed and 
retirees.  
Defined contribution or benefit 
The idea of a DB pension plan is that it will provide a pre-specified annuity upon 
retirement – either in absolute currency or a percentage of the employee’s salary (final 
or an accumulated average). If the pension is funded, the employee will be safeguarded 
against poorly management (e.g. badly investment) of the pension fund, since the 
employer will bear the risk.  
In DC pensions, on the other hand, employees agree to pre-specified contributions. 
These contributions are usually invested into financial assets. The annuity, which is 
calculated upon retirement, is subject to the performance of these investments and the 
employee bears the risk for his/her loss.  
DB spreads the investment risk over longer time, different ages and a larger number of 
individuals – consequently the risks are pooled and the risk-capacity is much larger than 
DC schemes. In a nutshell, the time horizon in a DC scheme is one individual’s lifetime 
while in a DB scheme it is much longer – if not infinite (Modigliani 2005). In 
comparison, DB plans offer a secure income after retirement whereas DC plans can 
facilitate more individual control over investments, with the potential of great profit/loss 
– depending on the financial performance of these. So, two individuals paying the same 
contribution might indeed end up with very different annuities, if one has chosen a DB 
plan and the other a DC plan. 
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The question of a comparative typology 
As pension systems differ, it calls for a method in order to categorise different pension 
systems, and the most widespread typology is the one adopted by the World Bank 
(World Bank 1994), which consists of a three pillar structure; 1st pillar: “a publicly 
managed system with mandatory participation and the limited goal of reducing poverty 
among the old.”, 2nd pillar: “a privately managed mandatory savings system.” and the 
3rd pillar: “voluntary savings.” 
However, this typology has been subject to much criticism, since some consider it to be 
more prescriptive than descriptive (OECD 2005: 19). As a result the OECD has 
developed a new framework that provides a more descriptive analysis and is intended to 
separate form from function. It does so by focussing on two tiers; the redistribution part 
and the insurance part of pensions. The redistributive elements are the ones created to 
guarantee pensioners an absolute, minimum standard of living. The insurance elements, 
on the other hand, are the ones aimed at achieving some target standard of living, and 
thus go further than merely eliminating poverty amongst elderly. Voluntary savings can 
make up for an additional third tier. These tiers can again be sub-categorised into 
public/private, defined benefit/defined contribution etc. (OECD 2004).  
In spite of this recent development, much of the discussion about pension reforms in 
Europe relates to the “old”, three pillar, typology. This again raises significant 
methodological problems when 25 different member states try to compare the design 
and the performance of their pension systems.  
4.3 RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
The underlying microeconomic principle in pensions systems is rather clear-cut: to 
create social security for elderly people, who no longer are active in the workforce, and 
thereby providing poverty relief. Generally speaking, there are only two ways of 
seeking this objective in old age – by storing current production or by exchanging 
current production with a claim on future production (Barr 2004: 188-189). The first 
option is rather hopeless, since it is too costly, doesn’t deal with uncertainty 
(preferences in taste etc.) or can be exchanged for services. Consequently the latter 
option is the appropriate solution and can, as explained, be organised in two ways, 
funded and PAYG schemes. 
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In macroeconomic terms, pensions are a way a smoothing consumption over a longer 
period of time, by avoiding that income (and thus consumption) stops when retiring. To 
illustrate this, let’s assume that all people in society were risk-adverse, rational beings. 
In this case, they would save an adequate amount of financial resources to be used when 
they cease to have a steady income (retirement). In economics, this is commonly known 
as the life-cycle-hypothesis. However, it is likely that certain volatility occurs in 
consumption and investment to make this unlikely (e.g. purchase of property, education, 
medical cost (especially in countries where these are not covered by the welfare state) 
etc.). In that respect, pensions must be seen as an insurance against the potential loss of 
resources during retirement; When an individual retire, he or she does not know exactly 
how much longer life will go on – and thus how many financial resources are needed 
for consumption. No one possesses the knowledge of when this event (death) will occur. 
The retired individual could drop dead tomorrow or live to be 100 years old. In other 
words, this event is characterized by uncertainty. The distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is very important, because actuarial insurance can cope with risk (since it is 
calculable), but not uncertainty (since it is not calculable). Even though one individual 
face uncertainty, a group of individuals can face risk – knowledge or estimation of the 
possibility of an event occurring – by pooling their uncertainty. This derives from the 
law of large numbers9. In this light, pensions are basically a bet with the pension 
sponsor (the state or a pension fund) – an individual pays a lump sum to the sponsor in 
exchange for at promise for an annuity. If the individual retires and drops dead 
instantly, the sponsor ‘wins’ – but if he or she lives to be 100, the individual ‘wins’ 
(Barr 2005: 105-106).  
Uncertainty and risk regarding financing 
Pensioners are, however, not the only ones facing the risk/uncertainty dilemma – this 
entails the financing of pension schemes as well. According to (Barr 2002: 5-6), three 
sorts of uncertainty are widely accepted amongst scholars: 
                                                 
 
9 The law of large numbers state that the behaviour of a large group is more predictable than that of an 
individual – the larger the group, the more predictable. 
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• Macroeconomic shocks affecting output, prices, or both. This is hardly surpris-
ing, since both PAYG and funded schemes are ways of organizing future claims 
on output – consequently a fall in output will have adverse affects. 
• Demographic shocks (sudden shifts in the age-dependency ratio10) he argues, af-
fect all pension schemes. 
• Political risks, since both schemes – although in different ways – rely on effec-
tive government.  
In addition, private funded schemes also face the risk of: 
• Incompetent or corrupt management, which is unknown to the pensioner due to 
imperfect information. 
• Investment risk, since pension accumulation is held at the stock market, which is 
sensitive to market fluctuations.  
• Annuity market risk, because the final annuity is dependent on remaining life 
expectancy and the rate of return, the insurance firm expect over those years. 
Both variables are subject to uncertainty. 
4.4 PENSION REFORMS 
Substantial disagreement exits about the financing aspect of pensions systems. As we 
already touched upon, the focal point of the ongoing debate has been the issue of 
demographic changes – and in particularly what system of pensions financing is best 
capable of coping with these challenges. Both systems seem to have advantages – 
PAYG systems protect pensions in payment against inflation. Finally, they can increase 
the real value of pensions in line with the economic growth in society (Barr 2004: 190-
191). It is often claimed that these advantages must be seen in light of redistributional 
aspect of PAYG systems; they are vulnerable to age structures that reduce the 
contributing workforce. This is measured by the age dependency ratio. Economists (and 
think tanks such as the Federal Trust) advocating this position claim that obvious 
problems arise, when large generations retire and smaller generations must pay for their 
pensions: in economic terms, the absence of equal overlap between generations. They 
instead see funded schemes as the right answer, since they are not as vulnerable to 
                                                 
 
10 Age-dependency ratio is the relation between number of pensioners and the number of active 
contributors 
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demographic changes (Federal Trust 2001). These discussions are the source of many 
headaches amongst economic policy-makers and there are no clear-cut answers to these 
problems – and certainly no clear consensus; 
The argument that funding insulates pensioners from demographic changes should not 
be overstated. From an economic point of view, demographic change is not a strong 
argument for at shift towards funding. 
Barr 2002: 10 
4.5 SUMMARY 
To sum up, it should be noted that the objectives of pension systems are three-fold; 
relief of poverty, consumption smoothing and insurance of pensioners. The central 
variable is future output; whether choosing a PAYG or a funded pension system, they 
are merely two different ways or organizing claims for future output. Both schemes face 
uncertainty – regarding output shocks, demographic shocks and political risk. Even 
though, much controversy exist the ideal design of pension and the answer is in nature 
impossible, since effective pension designs rely on country specifics – not a theoretical 
one-size-fits all model. 
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5 Globalization and the European context  
 
5.1 ACKOWLEDGING THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The transformation process, pensions are undergoing in Europe, cannot be analysed 
without recognition to the wider context of capitalist restructuring at the international 
level (cf. theoretical and methodological discussions). Consequently, an analysis of 
pension reform in Europe without regards to the historic and ideological development of 
the global political economy would be inadequate. This chapter will provide an 
examination how globalization has put pressure on the European welfare systems and 
caused change, identified by Jessop (2004). In the end of this chapter, we will asses how 
these tendencies relate to the pension systems, by setting up two theoretically grounded 
ideal types of projects competing at the EU level for hegemony with regards to the 
design of pension systems 
The restructuring of the political economy, which we are referring to, is known as 
globalisation. Even though the term globalisation has become a buzzword at the 
political scene, it essentially obscures more than it reveals. Generally speaking, 
globalisation covers a vast array of cultural, economical, social and political changes 
and developments that originate from many places in society. Globalisation is often 
presented as being inevitable and accordingly an urgent matter that should be given 
political attention and priority, thereby presenting ‘logic of no alternative’ (cf. Johansen 
2001: 11). Despite the urgency, it is hard to pinpoint what globalisation essentially is – 
and what consequences it entails.  
 
However, several neo-Gramscian scholars have a nuanced understanding of the global 
processes at stake, capturing the multidimensional nature of globalisation (see e.g. Cox 
1993b). According to our theory, globalisation should not be conceptualised as an 
independent variable influencing the dependent variable (e.g. pensions in Europe). 
Rather than adopting such a deterministic approach, we will see globalisation as an 
ongoing structural development with profound historical implications, involving – but 
not exclusively – economic. Globalisation is thereby not only to be regarded as a 
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process, but also as a project, thus referring both to its material and ideological nature. 
In this sense, globalisation covers a transformation of the relations of production, 
understood in the way of which trans-national social forces rearrange the relation 
between labour and welfare, and a neo-liberal ideological project, together constituting 
a global historic bloc (Overbeek 2003: 23-28). 
 
Cox describes the relations of production of globalisation as the globalisation of finance 
and the globalisation of production (Cox 1993b: 259-260). The globalisation of finance 
is rooted in the rapid development and spread of new communication technologies, and 
refers to the global emergence of an unregulated system of money and credit 
transactions. The financial capital e.g. multinational banks and pension funds now plays 
an important role in the private planning for global production, and has extended its 
mobility vis-à-vis the national states. It is capable of indirectly disciplining and shaping 
the governments’ policies on e.g. employment policies and monetary policy (Johansen 
2001: 95-96).  
The globalisation of production refers to the emerging “complex transnational networks 
of production, which source the various components of the product in places offering 
the most advantage on costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labour, and also the 
advantages of political security and predictability” (Cox 1993b: 259f). Therefore, the 
various processes of production are no longer confined to the limits of one national 
economy, which enable the transnational firms to minimise tax-liabilities and maximise 
profits (Johansen 2001: 96). The rise of transnational capital has facilitated a 
strengthening of the transnational capitalist class for example expressed at the European 
level through the influence of the ERT (Van Apeldoorn 2002).     
The globalisation processes has also strengthened the position of capital vis-à-vis 
labour. Unions have lost influence in the corporative structures in the states and the 
decentralised production has divided the labour force into segments of e.g. skilled and 
non-skilled workers and between those employed in national and transnational firms, 
which has complicated further a strong cohesive labour class  
Johansen 2001: 97 
In the political and ideological realm, globalisation seems to be entering the vocabulary 
of policy-makers to describe the emergence of new structures of capital flows. The 
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overarching answer to meeting the challenge of globalisation is to raise the 
nation/region/regime’s competitiveness. The solution of raising competitiveness seems 
to be subject to the assumption that international markets are increasingly coming in 
line with global equilibrium dynamic. Even though this assumption is clear in the 
conceptual definition of globalisation, it is rather absent in empirical debates about the 
issue. The fact that international markets have become – or will in the near future – be 
one unified marketplace, is hard to establish to say the least (Watson 2005: 199-210). 
 
The imperative of competitiveness – the idea that regions should as the EU necessarily 
be competitive in the global economy – is rather new on the level of political policy-
making. In the past, the notion of competitiveness was applied mainly at the level of 
firms and enterprises, which were the only entities to be considered competitive (and 
thus profitable) or uncompetitive (thereby subject to bankruptcy). In recent years, 
however, the competitive imperative has moved upwards in policy-making jargon, from 
the level of firms to the level of national/regional economies (Krugman 1994). Krugman 
sees this tendency as ‘dangerous’ and ‘misleading’ because the fortunes of national 
economies cannot be reduced to a question of, how well they perform on the world 
market. Nation states or trading blocs (e.g. the EU versus NAFTA) are not in 
competition with each other the same way firms or enterprises are – therefore he 
concludes that it is meaningless to apply the notion of competitiveness to 
national/regional economies since they are in no way subject to the same economic 
dynamics of firms in direct competition with each other.  
5.2 WELFARE STATES AND GLOBALISATION 
In order to place globalisation in the context of pensions, we need to trace the 
transformation that welfare states in Western Europe have undergone since World War 
II. Pensions are a vital part of the redistributional policies that emerged in the wake of 
the Great Depression, which by many was seen as a result of the reckless laissez-faire 
management of economies in the 1920’s. To avoid a repeat of this misery, most 
governments adopted Keynesian11 macroeconomic policies. Keynesian policies sought 
                                                 
 
11 John Maynard Keynes(1886-1946) was a influential British economist, who is by many considered to 
be one of the founders of modern theoretical macroeconomics. His most important book was the 1936 
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to smooth consumption by increasing government spending – thereby stimulating the 
effective demand in order to combat the adverse effects of recessions, depressions and 
booms. This objective pursued by this demand-side economic management was full-
employment. During the period from 1945-70 the Keynesian model was very successful 
and basically uncontested. Then in the 1970’s, the Keynesian welfare states plummeted 
into economic crisis; when productivity growth stagnated, profits went down while 
wages and prices went up. The sudden rise of inflation - which Keynesians had seen as 
an acceptable result of the full-employment strategy - made the economic situation in 
Europe unstable. In response, Keynesian welfare policies were gradually abandoned in 
exchange for monetarist policies advocated by diehard neoclassical economists such as 
Hayek and Friedman (Overbeek 2003: 2-10). Monetarists argued in favour of 
abandoning full-employment as the top government priority but in stead focussing on 
price stability, and in time the monetarist thinking gained the ideological hegemony 
over the Keynesians in Europe.  
 
The reasons for the Keynesian welfare model losing ground are hard to asses. Bob 
Jessop argues four main explanations for the crisis; First and foremost, the primary 
object of economic governance of the Keynesian model is the national economy. 
Control of economic flows over borders, setting employment goals, creating 
infrastructure for growth and the like were all means that were orientated towards the 
confined national economy. This situation was undermined by the economic 
internationalisation – it became problematic for nation states to act as though their 
economies were closed entities with domestic growth dynamics when the economies 
became more open and enterprises went international.  
Second, the objects of the social governance within the Keynesian welfare model are the 
national population. This should be understood in the way that social policy was geared 
towards full-employment, lifelong employment and patriarchal nuclear family as the 
basic social unit. These patterns began to break up when women entered the labour 
market and immigration of foreigners intensified. This development created a demand 
for differentiated social policies that the Keynesian welfare state couldn’t provide.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
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Third, the primacy of the nation state as a sovereign body. This has been undermined by 
the institutionalisation of supranational bodies with the subsequent transfer of 
competences (such as the European Union and GATT/WTO). Jessop argues that this 
has led to a gradual hollowing-out of the nation states’ sovereignty and control, since 
economic and social policy is pursued at the supranational/international/regional level. 
The construction of European Union is in this regard an illustrious example of how 
economic growth is attempted to be secured once again – but at another scale than the 
confined nation state.  
Finally, the state’s role in the economy was questioned because of political resistance 
against taxation, the relation between industrial capital and organized labour 
deteriorated and the rise of 'stagflation' (inflation and stagnation combined) contributed 
to the (neo-liberal) perception that the state was unequipped to handle the economy 
(Jessop 2003: 29-38).  
 
According to Jessop, these developments turned Western Europe away from the 
Keynesian approach to welfare towards a Schumpeterian workfare12 regime.  The 
Schumpeterian workfare model is characterized by; being post-nation in the sense that 
the state is no longer responsible for correcting market failures within its own borders. It 
promotes innovation and flexibility in open economies and calls for state intervention 
on the supply-side and seeks to enhance the overall competitiveness of the society (no 
longer confined to the borders of the nation state). Competitiveness thus becomes the 
new focal point, replacing the ideal of full-employment. The contrast between the 
Keynesian model and the Schumpeterian is sharp; in the Schumpeterian model, full-
employment is a mere product of a successful enhancement of the structural 
competitiveness rather than demand-side management; the Keynesian model tried to 
promote social rights of national citizens while the Schumpeterian model proclaims 
welfare services that mainly benefits business and thereby degrades the individual to a 
second rank position (Jessop 2003: 39).  
In sum, the Schumpeterian workfare regimes prompt entrepreneurship and the creative 
                                                 
 
12 In the Schumperian realm, welfare is transformed into workfare, because social policy is subordinated 
to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness (Jessop 2003: 39).  
  
 
 
 
37
destruction13 of outdated innovations as the answer to a successful society. In the focus 
on entrepreneurship, competitiveness etc. the Schumpeterian workfare philosophy 
establishes itself in line with a neo-liberal ideology, where the focus is on creating a 
society where economic rationalities becomes the driving force behind the allocation of 
resources (Nielsen 2006). 
 
One might claim that Jessop's characterisation of the development in the Western 
European welfare states is very much based on experiences from the UK, and that it 
bears no resemblance to the development in other welfare states like i.e. the Danish. 
Nielsen (2006) points out that most Danish welfare scholars claiming that the Danish 
welfare state hasn't undergone a neo-liberal restructuring during the last 20-something 
years are basically wrong. Their mistake is allegedly grounded in a misconception of 
what is neo-liberal – mistaking it for classic liberalism – and not recognising the 
genuine new aspects of the neo-liberal project. However Nielsen’s claim is that even the 
Danish welfare model, which is often seen as still being inspired by Keynesian thinking 
in its overall design, has gradually moved towards a neo-liberal workfare regime. The 
point is that neo-liberal restructuring of society has to be measured in a longer time 
perspective, and that these developments cannot be captured sufficiently by measuring 
the relative size of ‘the state’ vs. ‘the private’. Instead the changes in the content of 
welfare programmes will reveal which way the welfare state is heading. Initiatives like 
‘the active labour market policies’ can definitely be seen as a step in the direction 
towards a workfare regime (Nielsen 2006). This debate is not the main concern for our 
project but as an ideal type we find this description useful to describe developments that 
have been taking place to a smaller or larger extent in most Western European welfare 
states from around the 1970s onwards. Thus we make a generalisation of an overall 
European development, while we of course recognise that this is somehow misleading 
due to the profound differences between the European welfare systems. 
                                                 
 
13 The concept of creative destruction implies that innovation in one area will always affect another area, 
which will have to improve itself (thereby destructing). In this sense, creative destruction tries to capture 
industrial change as a never-ending chain reaction. 
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5.3 ‘THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT’ 
So, even though Jessop’s account of the transformation of welfare regimes in Europe 
seems straightforward, it is a generalisation as an attempt to describe a tendency. In 
order to grasp the development of welfare states, it must also be recognized that social 
and political forces advocating enhanced social protection are present in most Western 
European welfare states (especially in “strong” welfare states such as the Scandinavian 
ones). The dual existence of forces advocating free markets and regulated markets is 
best characterized by Karl Polanyi14. He put forward the thesis that with the 
development of capitalism in the nineteenth century, the economy had ‘dis-embedded’ 
itself from society and would have to be socially and politically ‘re-embedded’ through 
social struggles. Polanyi argued that the idea of the self-regulating market was in itself a 
‘utopia’. Consequently, the capitalist development was ontological bound to be 
characterized by a ‘double movement’ – when the market was dis-embedded from the 
institutional context, it would provoke a counter-movement by social forces to re-embed 
the market into institutions with the intent of regulating the market again (Jessop 2001). 
In order to capture this double movement in the field of pensions, we have chosen to put 
forward two ideal types.  
5.4 DEFINING IDEOLOGICAL IDEAL TYPES 
Inspired by Van Apeldoorn 2002 and 2003, Plehwe et al. 2006 and Polanyi, we choose 
to define two ideal types as a neo-liberal and a social-democratic ideology. The neo-
liberal ideology can best be described as an expressed belief in the superiority of 
market-driven competition as the best mechanism of economic allocation and a 
privileging of property rights above social rights as the fundamental condition of liberty 
(Plehwe et al. 2006: 1-3). The neo-liberal project is in this respect leaning towards the 
Schumpeterian workfare model in the sense that the key to success is to prompt 
‘entrepreneurship’ and create ‘business friendly’ environments.  
In contrast, the social-democratic ideology can be narrowed down to a firm conviction 
that the market is not able to regulate itself and thus it calls for government action to 
                                                 
 
14 Karl Polanyi was a Hungarian economist, who wrote the influencial book The Great Transformation 
(1944) – a historical account for the development of capitalism, which emphasized that market economies 
were inseparably linked to the state. Ironically his younger brother, Michael, also went on to become a 
prominent economist – who praised the free market.  
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ensure social equality. Consequently, the social democratic project highlights the need 
and protection of social rights. Government policies thus aim at redistribution in order 
to abolish poverty and social inequality (Barr 2004: 51-53). These two ideologies are 
rooted in two different perceptions of the interplay between economics and politics. The 
neo-liberal ideology argue that state and market can – and should – be separated as 
much as possible, or at least that the state should not interfere with the market, unless it 
is with the purpose of re-establishing the free competition. The social-democratic 
ideology perceives this as false and that the market should remain under some sort of 
political control.  
5.5 SUMMARY 
Pension systems are profoundly rooted in national welfare states. However, the 
Keynesian welfare state model, which was dominant in most of Western Europe from 
the end of WWII to the 1970s, has gone through transformation. As Jessop argues, 
certain factors (such as the expanding of international organisations and the 1970’s 
stagflationairy crisis) have caused the primate of demand-side government policies to 
disintegrate. Instead, he argues, governments are increasingly moving towards 
Schumpeterian workfare policies, which are characterised by supply-side stimulation, 
the focus on innovation and transnational cooperation.  
Even though it is hard to asses what is really causing this transforming, it is fair to say 
that globalisation has put further pressure on the change. Globalisation is a multi-
facetted change, whose nature is almost impossible to document as a unified process. It 
spans over a complex transformation of the relation between labour and capital. Indeed, 
globalisation opens up for the possibility of invoking the ‘logic of no alternatives’ to 
issues, which were formerly seen as the prerogatives of nation states. 
In spite of this development, the picture is not only one-sided. Social forces are resisting 
this roll-back of the welfare state and advocating enhanced social protection – which the 
Schumpeterian workfare model tends to disregard as an aim in itself, but rather a 
consequence of a successful supply-side management. In order to grasp this ‘double 
movement’, we have derived two ideal types relating to political ideological projects, 
which will recur in our further analysis of the OMC of pensions; the social democratic 
and the neo-liberal. 
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6 The institutional setup of the EU  
 
This chapter aims at showing how the EU can be seen as an institutionalisation of neo-
liberal imperatives. The European order can be seen as a product of struggles for 
hegemony between different ideological projects, and the institutional setup of the EU 
today firmly rests on an embedded neo-liberalism as we will show below. This 
constitutional bias severely limits and constrains the social policy choices of member 
states. Thus this bias determine ‘the limits of the possible’ and thereby it has 
implications for the 'openness' of the OMC of pensions, as it curbs the list of social 
policy instruments from which member states can chose in order to reach the common 
objectives.  
As our analytical approach is based on a neo-Gramscian perspective, the bulk of this 
chapter will draw on Van Apeldoorn's (2002 and 2003) analysis of the struggle over 
European integration and order. He identifies three political ideological projects that 
have been competing for hegemony: the neo-liberal, the neo-mercantilist and the social 
democratic. Later in our analysis we will elaborate further on the two of these projects, 
relating them to the pension issue. 
In the second part of the chapter we discuss how the EU-system of governance and 
lobbyism has developed into an opaque web of formal and informal routines, favouring 
economic interests with the ability to organise themselves and raise their voices on the 
right places. This we argue is a major implication for a balanced ‘openness’ of the 
political processes towards - what is at times called - civil society. The shortage of a 
democratic political debate framing diverging ideological interests at the EU-level, can - 
at least in theory - be compensated for by the equal access to the process for diverging 
organised interests. 
6.1 THE STRUGGLE OVER EUROPEAN ORDER 
It was not clear from the very beginning that the EU would end up with a bias favouring 
economic liberalisation at the relative expense of social protection provisions. Before 
the Rome Treaty of 1957 the socialist French Prime Minister Guy Mollet tried to make 
harmonization of social regulations and fiscal burdens a precondition for the integration 
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of industrial markets. For various political reasons things didn’t work out as anticipated 
by the French, and instead the governments of the original six member states promised 
each other to increase social protection on their own initiative (Scharpf  2002: 646). The 
corollary was the political decoupling of social protection and economic integration 
issues on the European scene, a decoupling which has been evident all the way up 
through the history of the EU from Rome to Maastricht (Scharpf 2002: 646). This has 
given the EU-system a constitutional asymmetry because market integration and free 
competition are protected by community law. The bulk of social policy issues remain 
the prerogatives of the member states. Through the doctrines of ‘supremacy’ and ‘direct 
effect’ the ECJ can potentially overrule any kind of member state legislation and/or 
practice, if they are not in line with EC-law. This has in fact happened on several 
occasions. The asymmetry arises because economic integration is constitutionally a 
matter of the EU, while social protection is not. I.e. securing ‘the four freedoms’ has 
traditionally been the greatest concern of the ECJ, sometimes leading to verdicts being 
very close to overruling even basic human rights provisions of a member state’s 
constitution. Even though the ECJ has applied a pragmatic approach to the issue of 
human rights, it has also established that constitutional provisions of member states can 
and will be overruled if the ECJ deems it to be in contrast to the ‘acquis’. Indeed it is 
fair to say that the issue of rights has been interpreted in such a manner, that economic 
freedoms of the market will be promoted (for a comprehensive overview of issues of 
EC-law see Steiner and Woods 2003). So national welfare systems remain in the 
shadow of EC-law (Scharpf 2002: 647). This it not to say, that a development of 
generous welfare states has been made impossible by the mere existence of a supreme 
system of EC-law, in fact welfare states flourished in Western Europe from the 1950s 
onwards (see also the previous chapter).  
 
Since the 1980s three different ideological projects has been competing for hegemony in 
a European context; a neo-mercantilist, a neo-liberal, and a social democratic project 
(See Van Apeldoorn 2002, and 2003 for a shortened version). The projects have basic 
different views on how society shall be arranged, and thus also in which purpose the EU 
shall serve, and have thus been created as well as used by social groups. The creation of 
the different projects should be seen in the historical context they have emanated from. 
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In the 1970s and 80s ‘Europessimism’ was prevailing and the European integration 
process was stagnating. The post-war growth was also stagnating and European 
economy was lacking behind USA and Japan. In the end 80s and beginning 90s the 
integration process was relaunched with the SEA and later the Single European Market 
programme. In this new integration process different projects of Europe came to 
compete with one another, as three European responses to the crisis of European 
capitalism and globalisation. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 150) 
 
Up to the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the projects contended – through support from 
different social forces - for the construction of a European order. The ‘neo-mercantilist 
project’ saw the stagnating European economy as caused by insufficient economies of 
scale and a technology gap compared to the global competitors. Hence, the solution to 
the problem should be protective measures and industrial policies aimed at the 
promotion of ‘European champions’. A strong European market should thereby serve 
both as a stepping-stone to the global market and a protective shield against outside 
competition. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 151). The neo-mercantilist project, thus, had a 
focus on protecting the interests of industrial capital (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 80).   
The ‘neo-liberal project’ evolved as an alternative project for the capitalist classes – 
especially the growing global capitalist class consisting of global financial capital and 
large industrial transnational companies. The project became manifest in the ‘Euro-
sclerosis’ discourse, that claimed the problems with European economy were caused by 
‘institutional rigidities’ such as trade unions and government interventions. Hence, the 
EU should promote more negative integration i.e. market liberalisation and 
deregulation. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 150) 
Finally, the ‘social democratic project’ was foremost articulated by Jacques Delors, and 
viewed European federalism as the solution to the crisis of the Left in the new era of 
globalisation. A strengthening of the EU was a way to protect the ‘European model of 
society’ from the dangers of globalisation and neo-liberalism. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 
151). The project stressed an inclusion of the social dimension - i.e. more positive 
integration - into the EU’s competences, to secure the European welfare state systems 
against globalisation and the neo-liberal agenda (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 79). The policy 
proposals, therefore, promoted ‘state-building programs on the back of market-building 
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successes. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 152) This is the main reason why the Delors 
Commission has also been characterised as pursuing “a Russian doll strategy” pushing 
for more European level regulations on social issues subsequent to enhanced economic 
integration. Meaning that the more or less clean economic integration objectives of the 
SEA was the first Russian doll framing the possibilities for other initiatives – the 
smaller dolls, i.e. social regulations (Bieling 2001; 101). 
Thus the supremacy of EC-law began to cast its shadow over the welfare states in the 
1980s with the SEA which – after years of slow progress - so to speak put the 
integration process back on track. The SEA furthered goals of deregulation and 
liberalisation, through the increased focus on anti-discrimination and free competition. 
(Scharpf 2002: 647) 
 
The Maastricht treaty can be seen as a compromise and outcome of the struggles 
between the three projects, however, biased in favour of the neo-liberal project. The 
most important element of the treaty – The EMU – was clearly in line with the neo-
liberal thinking. Other elements such as the ‘Trans-European Networks’ and ‘Research 
and Technological Development’ were inspired by neo-mercantilist proposals, and the 
‘Social chapter’, albeit rather weak, was a reflection of social democratic viewpoints. 
(Van Apeldoorn 2003: 156)  
 
The Maastricht treaty reflects the rise or initial peak of a new ideological project Van 
Apeldoorn has termed ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. Embedded neo-liberalism is 
embedded in the sense that it recognizes the limits to laissez faire and recognises the 
need ‘for the state to seek and secure the conditions for competitiveness.’ (Van 
Apeldoorn 2003: 158). Hence, embedded neo-liberalism is basically a reformulation of 
the neo-liberal project. In the 90s, the neo-liberal project had to be reformulated because 
of strong path dependencies in Europe e.g. the resistance of corporatist class relations, 
and the social and industrial protection provided by the member states (Van Apeldoorn 
2003: 156-157). Although sceptical to labour unions the new project to some extent 
recognises them, perhaps as a sacrifice to produce consent across social classes (Van 
Apeldoorn 2003: 159). The project of embedded neo-liberalism corresponds with what 
Nielsen (2006) – drawing on Jessop and others -defines as the real neo-liberalism, 
  
 
 
 
44
stating that many – often critical - conceptions of neo-liberalism have mistaken it with 
classic liberalism. However the new aspect in the neo-liberal discourse is the 
recognition of the need for a strong state to facilitate the unleashing of the market 
forces. Thus the neo-liberal project is not so much about dissolving the state, as it is 
about subjecting the allocation of resources to the rationalities of the market. The 
public-private divide becomes second order in this context, because public authorities 
eventually also will be subjected to the rationalities of free competition (Nielsen 2006). 
However in order not to confuse the concepts too much we have chosen to use the term 
embedded neo-liberalism to describe this project. 
 
The project of embedded neo-liberalism is pursuing a strategy which Stephen Gill 
(1998) conceptualise as new constitutionalism, which he describes as an international 
governance framework that: 
(…) seeks to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to 
make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces and 
correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes. New-
constitutionalism is the politico-legal dimension of the wider discourse of disciplinary 
neoliberalism.  
Gill 1998: 5 
Since the end of the 90s the concept of ‘competitiveness’ has been linked to the project. 
The concept has appeals to all three ‘old’ projects, and thus enables the neo-liberal 
ideology to neutralise, or in neo-Gramscian terms assimilate, the opposition of the other 
two projects. The embedded neo-liberal discourse of competitiveness promotes the 
introduction of ‘benchmarking’ and the creation of best practices as tools for comparing 
and evaluating member state performances. (Van Apeldoorn 2003: 159). Hence, the 
project of embedded neo-liberalism has had profound influence on the policy discourse 
of the EU as a means to adapt to the ‘inevitability of globalisation’ (Ibid: 159-60). Van 
Apeldoorn assesses the new embedded neo-liberal project to be a potential hegemonic 
project to define the future of Europe (Ibid: 157).  
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6.2 THE SHADOW OF EC-LAW ON NATIONAL WELFARE SYSTEMS 
In line with neo-liberal thinking member states today face heavy constraints on the 
possibilities to influence the course of their own economies and to realise self-defined 
socio-political goals. Market integration and the EMU have deprived member states of 
economic and monetary policy instruments, with which they used to be able to 
influence growth and employment (Scharpf 2002: 648). The SGP impose constraints on 
public expenditure, limiting the scope for running deficits at times with economic 
recession. As public pension systems represent the bulk of social expenditure there will 
necessarily also be put pressure on these (Pochet and Natali 2004: 1). The perceived 
costs from this monetary and economic integration of course partly depend on your 
attitude - grounded in different economic theories - towards the effectiveness of national 
monetary and economic policy instruments. Monetarists claim that national monetary 
policies are ineffective for correcting asymmetric shocks, be they permanent or 
temporary, because even if these instruments work they usually make countries worse 
of. Keynesians on the other hand believe that national monetary policies are powerful 
instruments for absorbing asymmetric shocks, because the world is full of rigidities and 
uncertainties (De Grauwe 2005: 85-86). However the only instruments that are in 
principle available under European law today “are supply-side strategies involving 
lower tax burdens, further deregulation and flexibilization of employment conditions.” 
(Scharpf 2002: 649). Furthermore governments face strong economic incentives to 
pursue strategies of the kind that is often labelled ‘social dumping’15, in order to attract 
foreign enterprises creating jobs and national growth (ibid: 649).  
 
Thus it seems plausible that monetarist and neo-liberal thinking has gained a hegemonic 
position, now firmly sediment in the constitutional setting of the EU. This neo-liberal 
bias influence ‘the strategic selectivity’ (Johansen 2001) and ‘the social purpose’ (Van 
                                                 
 
15 In the EU the economic integration, and especially the free movement of workers and capital, is 
combined with the member state authority over social policy measures, thus so-called ‘competitive 
deregulation’ is a possibility. It refers to a situation where companies in areas with low social wages and a 
comparably low degree of redistributive social policy measures will be able to undercut the prices of 
competitors who are situated in areas with high redistribution and high social benefits. These 
uncompetitive firms will then be forced to either; close down, consider to relocate or put pressure on the 
local authorities to reduce the social wages. This could fuel a downward spiral in social provisions, 
making it a system of lowest-common-denominator. Sometimes also called ‘social dumping’. (Leibfried 
and Pierson 1995) 
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Apeldoorn 2002) of the EU as a whole. This sets ‘the limits of the possible’ for policies 
deriving from the EU, as well as – as we have shown above - policies developing at 
member state level. Thus it will necessarily frame possible policy recommendations in 
the OMC of pensions. In this way it will also frame debates over pension reforms. Even 
though the EU and the OMC of pensions might not be mentioned explicitly in national 
debates about the future of pension systems, it might indeed play a subtle role. 
Eventually member state governments will have to consider their obligations under 
community law when reforming their pension systems.  
 
In the report establishing the OMC of pensions it is spelled out that the process  
(…) will take its place alongside a range of well functioning EU processes which, as 
part of their wider remit, deal with aspects of pension policies. It will be important to 
ensure the coherence with the processes which are already established. 
SPC and EPC 2001  
These include the BEPG16 and the SGP. Thus, it is made quite clear that these are the 
imperatives, framing the possible outcomes of the OMC process. 
6.3 NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
In recent years much political research has focused on the move from government to 
governance, which signalises that analysing governing procedures in contemporary 
society is much more complex than describing formal power structures. Jachtenfuchs 
and Kohler-Koch (2004: 99) define governance as: "the continuous political process of 
setting explicit goals for society and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals". 
Thus, they are close to a classic definition of politics, however without a description of 
who is setting goals and intervening. The discussion of who is in ‘reality’ making 
policies is also a major concern for most governance scholars focusing on the problems 
with accountability and transparency of contemporary political governance. 
                                                 
 
16 The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines is a Treaty based coordination of economic policies, under the 
supervision of DG ECFIN. "The BEPGs outline the medium-term economic policy strategy on how to 
reach the Lisbon goal." (Commission 2004). One part of the BEPG is in fact devoted to ageing and its 
financial implications. So member states should develop strategies for confronting longer-term 
demographic challenges and report them to the Commission together with their Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (Pochet and Natali 2004: 11). 
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Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004) identify networking as the most important feature 
of EU-governance, because there is - unlike the parliamentary democracies of the 
member states - no real framing of diverging ideological interests. The EU-system as a 
whole and the issues dealt with are very complex, thus gathering information, expertise 
and argument seems to be the key to be able to define and frame a given situation or 
problem (Ibid: 105). Thus it seems obvious that a traditional description of politics that 
are shaped and decided purely within hierarchical systems with democratically 
accountable governments being in control of the processes is no longer sufficient. John 
Peterson describes this by stating that modern democratic governance is taking place 
somewhere between hierarchy and markets, where outcomes are products of relations of 
"mutuality and interdependence as opposed to hierarchy and independence" (Peterson 
2004: 117). The underlying assumption is that the way networks are organised is a key 
determinant of policy outcomes. And thus the links between organisations rather than 
the organisations themselves become the interesting focal point for analysis (Peterson 
2004). Analysing these links is relevant also in a neo-Gramscian perspective which  
(…) regards ‘policy networks’ primarily as channels of communicative and political 
interaction, ensuring the hegemony of ideologically more cohesive political leadership. 
Bieling 2001: 97 
Thus these links will reveal how historic blocs are constituted and sustained and how 
this can be a facilitator for social change or inertia. With regards to the OMC of 
pensions the formal and informal networks surrounding the process, now and in the 
future, will disclose the dynamics driving the process. 
 
According to Peterson (2004: 119) network analysis starts with three basic assumptions: 
First that modern governance as mentioned above to a large extent works without 
hierarchical enforcement through the threat of coercion. Secondly, that the policy 
process has to be disaggregated in order to be understood. And thirdly that governments 
still have a role to play, even though they have lost traditional control with central 
processes. We would argue that the first and the third assumption correspond very well 
with Gramsci's conception of hegemony exercised through both consent and coercion. 
Governments may continuously lose control but they still have a great role to play in the 
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governing of society, which is a quite ambiguous statement, however being a well-
established mantra of contemporary governance studies. 
 
The role of intellectuals in the process of turning an otherwise political process open for 
discussion into a closed issue of technicalities is, as Gramsci had also observed, crucial. 
Networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence on an issue - or 
epistemic communities as Peter Haas has termed it - can dominate and more or less take 
control of a policy process (Peterson 2004: 121). This is in fact one of the central points 
of the new-constitutionalism approach referred to above (see also Gill 1998). Applying 
a bold concept like 'constitutionalism', points to the fact that there are a number of 
examples where minor changes in EU-governance procedures have led to a bigger 
change in the entire EU-system. For instance in the area of social policy, it used to be 
very easy to block social policy proposals, before QMV was introduced on some social 
policy areas. The QMV implicitly made possible the establishment of the Social 
Dialogue, where the Social Partners17 now has a status as co-legislators18, with a right of 
initiative and policy-formulation, which used to be the prerogatives of the Commission, 
the Council and in some cases the Parliament. However even if the Social Partners have 
now occupied a rather powerful position, their cooperation still to a large extent seems 
to be in a state of inertia with regards to producing common agreements on vital issues. 
(Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004: 106-107) 
 
With the OMC the Commission has taken a central and powerful position, because it 
has to provide the framework and infrastructure and common conceptions for the 
cooperation between the member states. This supports a trend towards informality and 
selective networking, which decreases the transparency and accountability of the 
process. Even though the member states are the key players in the OMC, they tend to 
lose their gate keeping power because the interest intermediation at the EU-level will be 
                                                 
 
17 ETUC (the trade unions) and UNICE, UEAPME and CEEP (the employers' organisations) 
18 In 1985 the then European Commission President Jacques Delors formally launched the bipartite 
European Social Dialogue between the ETUC and the employers. The Maastricht Treaty, which came 
into force in 1993, recognised the social partners’ right to negotiate binding Europe-wide framework 
agreements, which are either formalised into EU legislation as Directives, or implemented 
‘autonomously’ by the partners at European and national levels. 
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biased towards those who have the capacity to organise themselves and raise their voice 
(Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004: 108-109). 
6.4 LOBBYING AND INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN BRUSSELS 
Over the years the lobby activities in Brussels has experienced a significant boom. In 
the mid eighties one scholar estimated that around 500 Europe-wide pressure groups - in 
one way or the other - was involved in trying to affect the decisions making processes in 
the EC, another scholar even reached numbers as high as 654 (Mazey and Richardson 
2001: 225). Already in 1992 the Commission estimated that as many as 3000 special 
interest groups - as well as more than 200 firms - had set up some kind of representation 
in Brussels. At that time this ‘lobbying industry’ employed more than 10 000 people 
(Ibid: 225). Today there is reason to believe that almost any policy sector or issue area 
has got its own Euro-association, with special focus on policies deriving from the EU 
(Ibid: 225). Interest groups started focussing on Brussels - in larger numbers - once it 
became evident that it was a new centre for political decision-making (Ibid: 223). A 
development in lobby activities of this character must be assumed not to be completely 
arbitrary, and it seems beyond reasonable doubt that presence in Brussels potentially 
pays off in one way or the other. This pay off might in fact be anticipated in a distant 
future, as an experienced lobbyist bluntly has put it that: "Everything in the EU takes 10 
years at least" (Chris Verhaegen, April 2006). 
 
The Euro-lobbying system has on several occasions been characterised as a very 
complex series of interactions between a multitude of actors, on different arenas, levels 
and sectors, which makes it extremely difficult to make generalisations about the true 
nature of lobbyism (Mazey and Richardson 2001: 223). Thus a discussion about the 
lobbying issue is almost unavoidably bound to be tentative.   
 
The central component in the lobbying activities in Brussels seems to be information. In 
one way or the other a successful interest group can provide EU-institutions with 
valuable knowledge of different kinds. The extent to which an interest organisation will 
succeed in gaining access to an EU-institution depends on, what kind of information it 
can provide, and hence on what kind of information the specific EU-institution demands 
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(Bouwen 2002). Finally it also has to be pointed out that mere presence in Brussels can 
be vital even if you cannot influence the decision making. The risk of being taken by 
surprise by unfavourable EU-legislation will be minimised, when you know what is 
going on in Brussels (Mazey and Richardson 2001: 220). 
 
The interactions between EU decision makers and the organised interest groups seem to 
be very complex and opaque. Nevertheless, we might claim that we are dealing with 
relationships of reciprocity and interdependence (Bouwen 2002: 368 and Peterson 
2004). The combination of the Commission's need of the interest groups and its urge for 
legitimacy is among other things reflected in the way consultations and contacts with 
civil society has been organised, in a somehow structured and transparent way. 
However the mere number of consultative bodies and civil society organisations on the 
database for Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society (CONECCS)19, 
contributes to making the attempt to get an overview nearly impossible. But, it also 
indicates that contacts with civil society are a substantial activity of the ‘Eurocracy’. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have first accounted for the 'constitutional asymmetry' of the EU, 
which will potentially have severe consequences for the welfare systems in the member 
states. This 'strategic selectivity' already affects i.e. pension systems in the member 
states, and it will beyond doubt also frame the objectives, recommendations and 
working methods in the OMC of pensions, which we will touch upon in a subsequent 
chapter. Secondly we have discussed how the EU-system of lobbying and network 
governance today is a vast web of formal and informal contacts and interactions 
between public servants and lobbyists at many different levels. This will inevitably 
make the policy process complex and opaque, which will put the most well off interest 
groups in a favourable position with regards to influencing the processes. A small NGO 
office will thus be likely to have more than enough to do with just trying to take stock 
of the developments in different EU-processes. 
                                                 
 
19 http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm 
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7 The Lisbon Strategy and OMC on pensions 
 
At the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000 there was consensus among the 
member states, that EU was facing economic weakness, caused by long-term structural 
unemployment, a low employment rate and lack of service sector developments. In 
order to overcome these challenges the, at that time, 15 member states of the EU agreed 
on “a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and most 
knowledge-based economy in the world”, also known as the Lisbon Strategy or the 
Lisbon Agenda (Collignon et al, 2005: 1). The strategy didn’t come out of the blue, but 
was to some extend a follow up of previous European Councils where these issues 
already had had some influence. At the Luxembourg Process in 1997 unemployment 
was already in play and a strengthened European Employment Strategy (EES) was 
established. Later at the Cardiff Process in 1998 measures were to be taken to improve 
innovative capacity and efficiency in the labour market. And finally the Cologne 
Process in 1999 promoted ‘macro-economic dialogue’ between social partners, member 
state governments and EU institutions (Collignon et al 2005: 3; Régent 2002: 27).  
 
The aim of the Lisbon Strategy was to set goals for the future in strengthening 
employment, creating economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-
based economy. The objectives were targeted at accommodating economic 
competitiveness with social concerns (Collignon et al 2005:1). According to the 
conclusions of the agreements at the Lisbon summit, EU was facing major challenges 
because of globalisation and shifts to knowledge-driven economies within the EU 
(European Council 2000: section 5). The wording of the aims in 2000 was: 
… to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strategy aimed at:                   
− preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies 
for the information society and R&D [Research & Development], as well as by 
stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by 
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completing the internal market; 
− modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social 
exclusion; 
− sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by 
applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix. 
European Council 2000: section 5 
The Lisbon Strategy targeted specific areas for the member states to work on within the 
timeframe of 10 years - including education, life-long learning, research, innovation, 
employment, the environment and social policy, where the latter enclose reform of 
social protection systems in order to deal with an aging population. That EU should 
become the most competitive economy in the world, is a sentence that has touched a 
chord among scholars and politicians. It is a reasonable assumption that competitiveness 
has become one of the key-words in describing what the Lisbon Strategy is all about, 
and a sign on how the competitive imperative has moved beyond the cooperate arena 
and into the political arena. In accordance with the earlier chapter of this project, we 
will argue that the Lisbon Strategy with its focus on innovation and encouragement of 
entrepreneurship is based on Schumpeterian thinking.    
 
In order to meet the challenges, the Lisbon Strategy introduced the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) as the appropriate method to achieve these goals (Régent 2002: 1). 
The OMC was supposed to bring action in areas where member states shared a common 
concern, but Treaty competences was deficient (Schäfer 2006: 72). As described in the 
introduction of this report, OMC relies on voluntary cooperation from the member 
states and involves establishing guidelines for policy-making by setting indicators and 
benchmarks for the ‘best practices’. Monitoring through National Action Plans (NAP) 
or National Strategy Reports (NSR) and evaluations on the progress shall enable the 
member states to exchange knowledge and generate ‘best practice’ and hereby secure 
the goals agreed upon in Lisbon.  
 
Since OMC should be applied in a policy field where the responsibility and 
competencies entirely rest on the national governments, such as the field of social 
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security, the field of pensions became part of the OMC in 2001. The next section will 
explain what the OMC of pensions is all about, and what developments have happened 
since its initiation in 2001.  
7.1 OMC OF PENSIONS 
As a part of the overall goals of the Lisbon Strategy from 2000, OMC of pension was 
agreed upon by the Council in 2002, to secure and modernize national social security 
systems. Already at the Laeken summit in 2001 the Council adopted principles for 
national pension reforms, which included measures to be taken to make capacity 
correspond to social objectives, maintain financial sustainability and meet changing 
social needs. These 3 principles were specified in 11 objectives (Table 1 – for full text 
see Appendix) first presented in Joint report of the Social Protection Committee and the 
Economic Policy Committee in November 2001.  
 
Principle I: Adequacy of pension systems 
Objective 1: Preventing social exclusion (poverty among older people) 
Objective 2: Enabling people to maintain living standards 
Objective 3: Promoting solidarity within and between generations 
Principle II: Financial sustainability of pension systems 
Objective 4: Raise level of employment 
Objective 5: Decrease time in labour market 
Objective 6: Sustainable pension schemes in a context of sound public finances 
Objective 7: Balance benefits and contributions 
Objective 8: Ensure adequate and financial sound private pension provisions 
Principle III: Modernization to meet changing needs 
Objective 9: Adapt more flexible employment and career patterns and ensure  
pensions are compatible 
Objective 10: Greater equality of men and woman 
Objective11: Meet the challenges by transparency and broad political consensus 
 
Table 1: Objectives for OMC of pensions 
(Own interpretation according to Commission & Council 2003) 
 
 
The 11 objectives can be said to be the compromise of opposing committees, who was 
engaged by the Council to draft the joint report. In October 2001, prior to this 
compromise, EPC issued Progress Report to the ECOFIN Council on the Impact of 
Ageing Populations on Public Pension Systems with several reform proposals that bear 
resemblance with the suggestions from ERT's report on pensions from 1999. The report 
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from EPC was criticised for the lack of social objectives and for being narrowly focused 
on privatisation as the answer for the pension puzzle20. As a response to this criticism, 
the co-operation between EPC and SPC was assembled (De Deken 2003: 17 and 
Schuldi 2003: 29). 
 
In 2002 the first National Strategy Reports were presented by the member states - 
reports that should account for what measures the individual member states would take 
in order to meet the 11 objectives21 (Eckardt 2005: 253). Since these strategy reports 
barely touched upon how to reach the objectives but rather described national pension 
policy, the conclusions in Adequate and Sustainable Pensions – Joint Report by the 
Commission and the Council from March 2003 fails to describe best practices or present 
fully developed indicators on how to compare performances of different pension 
systems (Eckardt 2005: 254; De Deken 2003: 18).  
 
The Joint Report acknowledge the inadequate results of the first round of National 
Strategy Reports (NSR), and suggested measures to be taken to develop indicators and 
benchmarks in order to measure how the common objectives should be achieved 
(Commission & Council 2003: 97). At the time both EPC and SPC had been involved in 
developing indicators for comparison of pension systems, but this had proved to be 
more complicated as such. Thus indicators in use in the Joint Report was limited to 
relative poverty ratios and relative income circumstances for pensioners, as well as 
average age of retirement and public pension expenses calculated as percentage of GDP 
(Eckardt 2005: 254). In the Joint Report’s final remarks it is pointed out that the quality 
of some data was unsatisfactory, and the Commission and Council places value on its 
obligations – before the end of 2004 – “… to decide on the objectives, methods and 
timetable for the continuation of this coordination on pensions” (Commission & 
Council 2003: 97). Despite the lack of indicators the 2003 Joint Report did call on 
member states to improve incentives for workers to remain longer in labour market, to 
                                                 
 
20 EPCs recommendations were largely based on the projected developments of public pension 
expenditures. The countries relying heavily on first pillar pensions then came off worse. These countries 
critsised the lack of the neutrality of the selected indicators vis-á-vis different types of pensions 
provisions (Schludi 2003: 29) 
21 The National Strategy Reports can be downloaded at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/pensions_en.htm#1 
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strengthen the connection between benefits and contributions and increase public and 
private funding.  
7.2 INDICATORS 
The next round of NSRs was to be submitted by 15th of July 2005 and the member states 
were given a Guidance Note prepared by the Commission (SPC & EPC 2005), where it 
was emphasised what data the member states should submit. With the experience from 
the first round and the lack of measurable comparisons this guidance note set out 
indicators on each of the 11 objectives. The indicators have been developed by Indicator 
Sub-Group (ISG) of the SPC – a group created in 2001 to support the work of SPC. 
Parallel work is made by Aging Working Group (AWG) of the EPC, especially relating 
to the objectives of sustainability, and the chairmen of the two groups meet and discuss 
the progresses in developing indicators they eventually can mutually agree on (ISG 
2003: 2). ISG has since it initiation had the same chairman namely the Englishman 
David Stanton, who prior to his job in Brussels worked in OECD, where he has been in 
charge of numerous indicator working groups. According to Jørgen Witsø-Lund from 
the Social Ministry in Denmark David Stanton is “Mister Indicator (…) you can’t find 
anyone better” (cf. interview with Jørgen Witsø-Lund, May 2006). Both ISG and AWG 
rely heavily on Eurostat – the statistical office of the Commission under the 
Commissioner of Economic and Monetary affaires – and its production of Sustainable 
Development Indicators. In the Guidance note to the member states it is proposed that 
they use data from the EU sources to the extent it is possible; in order make the NSRs 
more comparable. The indicators to be used in the NSRs are first of all some general 
data on demography22, household structures23 and socio-economic information24. Then 
each objective of the OMC of pensions is presented with some indicators on which the 
member states should submit the relevant data. In Table 2 we have tried to insert some 
of the indicators to each objective of the OMC of pensions: 
 
                                                 
 
22 Current and projected population composition, life expectancies and old-age dependency ratios  
23 Housing tenure status of people aged 65+, data on living arrangement (living with children, with 
another adult or living alone) 
24 GDP per capita, recent growth and future prospects, employment and unemployment rates, pension and 
social protection expenditures as a % of GDP and Public finance situation (debt and deficits)  
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Principle I: Adequacy of pension systems 
Define25: What is an adequate income for older people? What is an acceptable minimum? Current 
situation of policy goals and achievements of goals. Future prospects, strategies and policy challenges. 
Objective 1: Preventing social 
exclusion 
Indicators: Risk of poverty  
• at different ages  
• in relation to their housing tenure 
• for people with main activity status ‘retired’  
Objective 2: Enabling people to 
maintain living standards 
Indicators:  
• Relative income for people aged 60+ 
• composition of income by source 
• median individual pension income for people aged 65-
74 in relation to median income for employed persons 
aged 50-59 
• income simulation - for current schemes and for post-
reform schemes  
• Current and prospective coverage rates as % of popula-
tion 15-64 
• Current and prospective level and share of pensioners 
income provided by statutory, occupational  and indi-
vidual schemes 
Objective 3: Promoting solidarity 
within and between generations 
Indicators:  
• Inequality of income distribution 
• Income share ratio for 60+, 65+ and 75+ relative to in-
come share ratio for complementary age groups, 
men/woman/total. 
Principle II: Financial sustainability of pension systems 
Define: The objectives as regard the financial sustainability of pension systems in line with the Laeken 
objectives. Estimation of total resources needed to provide adequate pensions (time horizon 2050). What 
% of GDP is needed to secure adequate pensions according to national definitions?  What level of 
resources will be available from private sources? Is private coverage sufficiently to prevent an adequacy 
gap?  
Objective 4: Raise level of 
employment 
Indicators:  
• Total employment rate - % of people aged 15-64 and 
30-54 in employment (total/males/females) 
• Current and projected economic or effective depend-
ency ratio 
Objective 5: Increase time in labour 
market 
Indicators:  
• Employment rates of older workers % of people aged 
55-59, 60-64, 55-64 and 65-9-69 (current and projected 
scenarios) 
• Effective age of withdrawal from the labour market 
• Numbers on how many beneficiaries to benefits allow-
ing early withdrawal 
Objective 6: Sustainable pension 
schemes in a context of sound public 
finances 
Indicators:  
• Projections on public expenditure on pensions (includ-
ing per person) 
• Breakdown of expenditure growth by main factors of 
change 
• Projected evolution of public pension reserve funds 
• Projected budgetary transfers to pension schemes 
                                                 
 
25 Define, should be understood as some overall questions to the general principle, that the member states 
has to answer in their NSRs  
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Objective 7: Balance benefits and 
contributions 
Indicators:  NONE 
But; discuss what measures will strike a fair balance between 
the active and retired 
Objective 8: Ensure adequate and 
financial sound private pension 
provisions 
Indicators:  
• Current and future contributions rates to private pen-
sion schemes 
• Current and projected level of reserves of public and 
private pension schemes in % of GDP 
• Current and real rates of return on assets in reserve 
funds (public and private) 
• Current and projected composition of assets held by re-
serve funds (public and private) 
 
Principle III: Modernization to meet changing needs 
Define: Trends in pension incomes of men and woman and main determining factors. Describe any forms 
of unequal treatment that subsist in pension systems. Do all groups on the labour market have sufficient 
opportunities to build adequate pension rights? Is professional or geographical mobility hampered by 
pension schemes? 
Objective 9: Adapt more flexible 
employment and career patterns and 
ensure pensions are compatible 
Indicators:  
• Typical length of vesting/waiting periods. 
Objective 10: Greater equality of men 
and woman 
Indicators:  
• Gender differences in the risk of poverty by age, calcu-
lated for type of household 
• Difference between men and woman in relative income 
(% point) 
• Average pension entitlements by sex, individual and 
derived rights, pensioners aged 65+. 
Objective 11: Meet the challenges by 
transparency and broad political 
consensus 
Indicators: NONE 
But; assess the quality and comprehensiveness of aggregate 
monitoring of pension systems. Describe steps taken to ensure 
the broadest consensus on the need and content of reforms 
undertaken. Assess the quality of information on the entitlement 
available to individuals – does the information allow individual 
retirement planning? 
 
Table 2: Indicators for OMC of pensions 
(Own interpretation according to SPC & EPC 2005) 
 
According to ISG's methodological reflections (ISG 2003), the focus of the indicators is 
to measure outcomes of national pension policies, rather than the actual policies and 
how they are achieved. Any proposed indicator shall have a clear normative 
interpretation – meaning that there must be an agreement among the member states, that 
any change is a positive outcome which should be evaluated against previous national 
performance. At the same time ISG admit that translating the general principles into 
practice has caused particularly difficulties in the area of pensions, since the objectives 
can be achieved through different pension systems and through many combinations of 
public and private schemes. Likewise, creating neutral indicators that regards all aspects 
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of 25 different pension systems across EU is a major challenge. Finally ISG admit to the 
difficulties in assessing indicators for adequacy of pensions when they have to be nested 
within indicators that are applicable with fiscal sustainability (ISG 2003).  
 
The use of benchmarks and indicators in the field of social policy has been criticised by 
scholars like De Deken, who points to the danger of rather simplistic comparisons.  
In evaluating national policy systems, single indicators actually can be quite 
misleading: conventional aggregate performance indicators do not reveal functional 
equivalents of policies, nor can they adequately take into account trade-offs between 
multiple policy goals. … Information on the complementarity of certain policies and on 
their institutional embeddedness tends to get lost in the sort of variable-oriented cross 
national comparison that benchmarking encourages.  
De Deken 2003: 7 
In other words, De Deken points to the same difficulties that ISG already acknowledge 
in their Progress Report from 2003, namely the complexity of comparing 25 different 
national pension systems.   
7.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE OMC ON PENSIONS 
In July 2005 it was time for the member states to submit their second NSR, this time 
with the support of the above mentioned indicators. In the recent Synthesis report on 
adequate and sustainable pension (Commission 2006) from February, the NSRs have 
been reviewed, on the basis of discussions and peer reviews conducted by the SPC in 
the autumn 2005. Despite acknowledgements of substantial progress in pension system 
reform across EU - with strengthen incentives to work longer, tighter links between 
benefits and contributions and promotion of provisions on supplementary pensions – 
some key issues to be monitored still exist. These includes  
 
• taking better account of new forms of employment and flexible working  
• monitoring financial sustainability of public pensions systems while taking ac-
count of the impact from private pensions schemes 
• reduce public debt 
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• developments of private provision to complement or partially replace public 
pension provision – but with security and equity ensured 
 
In addition to the Synthesis Report from February 2006, the OMC of pensions have 
been included in a new framework for social protection and social inclusion processes– 
a streamline adopted by the Council in March 2006. The overall goal is to simplify 
reporting procedures and bring existing OMCs in the areas of social inclusion and 
pensions plus cooperation in the field of health and long-term care under common 
objectives (Commission 2005a). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
60
8 Social forces and political projects in the OMC of 
pensions  
 
The two following sections of analysis will give an empirical account for the two 
political projects, identified earlier, and how they have been adopted and advocated by 
the social forces in the field of pensions. Since the neo-liberal project was first at 
gaining momentum in raising attention at the European level and was first latter (and 
maybe too late) challenged by the social democratic project, we will start off with the 
analysis of the neo-liberal project.  
 
8.1 TRACING THE NEO-LIBERAL PROJECT 
Introducing the concept of the ‘pension time bomb’ 
The debate concerning the matter of the future of European pension systems took centre 
stage in 1995, when the influential Federal Trust published the report The Pensions 
Timebomb in Europe. In it, the Federal Trust pointed to the fact that the current 
demographic developments26 would cause pay-as-you-go pension schemes to indebt 
member states beyond the acceptable. The answer to the puzzle, according to the 
Federal Trust, was a new partnership between public pension schemes and private 
funded pensions across Europe. The report also argues for the partial deregulation of 
pensions across the European Union and for the liberalisation of pension funds across 
borders (Taverne 2001: 9).  
The naming of the pension problem as a time bomb is largely funded in a logic of no 
alternative – as being an inevitable result, if immediate action is not taken. The phrase 
was also quickly adopted by the media and politicians and, in retrospect, marked the 
beginning of neo-liberal influence on the pension area. It was later used in the notable 
2001 conference, Defusing Europe’s Timebomb27, which we will return to later. 
                                                 
 
26 Namely the fact that the age-dependency ratio would change dramatically when the time came for the 
post WW2 ”baby-boom” generations to retire.  
27 Arranged by Friends of Europe, Fortis, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, PriceWaterHouseCoopers and 
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The Federal Trust 
The initiator, The Federal Trust, is a London-based think tank that engages in the debate 
surrounding economic challenges, and claims to have a particular interest in the 
European Union (namely the Euro, economic policies, foreign policies, and the design 
of social Europe) and, as the name reveals, advocates European federalism28. Lately the 
Federal Trust has also embraced subjects such as global governance in the WTO. It is 
chaired by Lord Taverne – a Liberal Democrat peer in the House of Lords as well as 
Chairman of AXA Equity & Law29. The Federal Trust conducts research about policy 
issues in which they advocate certain policy solution, in classic think tank manner. The 
research is conducted by study groups, comprised of intellectuals (like Professor Iain 
Begg, Professor Roger Morgan30), representatives from powerful opinion formers (such 
as European Roundtable of Industrialists, Bank of England, European Federation for 
Retirement Provisions, Unilever, PriceWaterHouseCoopers) and politicians (like former 
Commissioner for Internal Market Frits Bolkestein). In this sense, the Federal Trust can 
be characterized as an epistemic community: a site for exchange and development of 
knowledge – within the neo-liberal agenda. 
European Federation for Retirement Provision 
The alarm sounded by the Federal Trust was soon responded by the European 
Federation for Retirement Provision (EFRP). The EFRP is an organization, established 
in 1981, with the objective to promote occupational, funded schemes by opening up the 
Internal Market to better accommodate transnational funded pensions. EFRP’s members 
are national associations of pension funds from 22 member states but the organization 
also include a supporter’s circle, comprised by actors from the financial sector31. In 
1996, the EFRP published the report European Pension Funds – their impact on 
European Capital Markets and Competitiveness. In it, the EFRP recognized the 
graveness of the demographic challenge, and went a step further to put pressure on the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Federal Trust. 
28 A federal system is a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a 
central governing authority and constituent political units.  
29 A French insurance company, ranked the 13th largest company in the world according to Fortunes 
Global 500 list. 
30 Both London School of Economics 
31 Members of ERFP’s supporter’s circle include PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Bank of New York, ABN-
AMBRO, Capital Group International S.A., Fortis Bank NL and Goldman Sachs. 
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national governments to take action: 
Governments will have a major problem with these [public sector pensions] which 
could well jeopardise their Maastricht EMU convergence objectives as long as these 
unfunded pensions remain fast growing budgetary expenses. 
EFRP 1996: 120 
The EFRP recommended a move towards funded schemes, since they would contribute 
to the  
Achievement of the objectives of higher growth, of better functioning capital markets 
and of ‘averting the old age crisis’ which is after all ‘the biggest challenge of our time’.  
EFRP 1996: 122 
OECD and ‘window of opportunity’ 
The Federal Trust’s concern was soon echoed by the OECD in their 1995 and 1996 
reports, The Transition from Work to Retirement and Ageing in OECD countries: A 
critical policy challenge, respectively.  
The OECD is a Paris-based international organization conducting research in economic 
and social developments in their 30 member states (mainly rich, Western countries). 
OECD in addition, acts as a forum for comparing policy experiences, seek answers to 
common problems and identify good practices. The OECD have in the last 50 years 
gained a substantial agenda-setting power and their use of benchmarking and peer 
pressure (naming and shaming) have been to much inspiration for the design of the 
Open Method of Coordination (Schludi 2003: 27). Their 1998 report, Maintaining 
Prosperity in an Ageing Society, summarized the conclusions made in the two reports, 
which overall is in line with those drawn by the Federal Trust – that European pension 
systems are endangered by demographic changes due to their PAYG nature and thus is 
in need of rapid reforms: 
Population ageing in OECD countries over the coming decades could threaten future 
growth in prosperity. Governments should take action now across a broad range of 
economic, financial and social policies to ensure the foundations for maintaining 
prosperity in an ageing society. 
OECD 1998: 8 
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The OECD furthermore stressed the urgency of the problem by setting a timeframe and 
called for immediate action: 
 Since the main demographic pressures will start to emerge in about ten years’ time, our 
societies have a very limited window of opportunity to put reforms in place. 
OECD 1998: 5 
The concept of a ‘limited window of opportunity’ was soon adopted by the Federal Trust 
(2001), Friends of Europe (2001) and ERT (2000). 
European Round Table of Industrialists 
Another significant player in favour for the neo-liberal project is the ERT. The ERT is a 
group of chairmen from 47 major transnational European industrial corporations (Such 
as British American Tobacco32, Fiat, Carlsberg, Unilever, Shell, Volkswagen, Siemens, 
Phillips etc.). The ERT created a 'Welfare Society Working Group' in 1999, which was 
chaired by Carlo De Benedetti33. The workgroup published the report European 
Pensions, An Appeal for Reform: Pension Schemes that Europe Can Really Afford in 
2000. In it, the ERT emphasized that Europe’s competitiveness is under threat by 
excessive costs to taxpayers and business. The ERT argued that since 11 of the (then) 
15 member states had already entered the EMU, the potential ‘explosion’ of public debt 
would undermine the "confidence in the stability and political management of Europe’s 
new currency" (ERT 2000: 6). But crucially, the 2000 report again stress that Europe’s 
competitiveness was endangered by PAYG pensions:  
In the next decade, the EU badly needs to raise its annual growth rates above the dismal 
averages of the 1990s. If they are left unreformed, current pension systems will be a 
ball and chain holding back improvements in competitiveness and growth, or even 
undermining both. 
ERT 2000: 7 
This is a significant presentation of their neo-liberal agenda. The ERT directly links 
                                                 
 
32 Which also cooperates with the Federal Trust. 
33 A wealthy Italian businessman, owner of CIR Holding Company and the man who re-launched Olivetti 
in the early 1990’s 
  
 
 
 
64
public pension (i.e. PAYG financed) as a hindrance to the free market. It is no longer 
only a matter of the demographic challenges but also an issue of the public spending 
becoming a burden to the market. The ERT furthermore suggests that the public 
pensions should be reformed into funded DC schemes, following the theory that the 
market is the best solution for solving the demographic problem: 
The existence of investment risk is often used as an argument for preferring PAYG 
financing over funded programmes or, within the private sector, DB schemes over DC 
schemes. However, in global financial markets, private pension plans and in particular 
DC plans can offer investment options with minimal risk. 
ERT 2000: 43 
The above statement is presented without any further economic elaboration, but is 
merely supplied with a reference to Harvard economist Martin Feldstein34. There should 
be no doubt that the ERT have a profound fondness for funded pension schemes – this 
would also open up new financial markets, they note – but this is not only rooted in the 
urgency of finding an answer to the demographic challenge in Europe. In 2001, Carlo 
De Benedetti wrote an article, named The Need for Reform and a Social Approach, 
which featured in the Federal Trust report Pension Reform in Europe. In it, he pointed 
to the fact that PAYG systems are endangering the sustainability of Europe due to their 
redistributive nature: 
The problem [pension systems in Europe becoming unsustainable] is not only with 
demographics. Excessively generous pension systems, both in terms of eligibility rules 
and in terms of benefits paid out to retirees are added to it. Generosity of pension 
systems is more widespread than one could imagine. 
De Benedetti 2001: 46 
The perception of PAYG systems as being too generous is in line with the neo-liberal 
idea that social minimum standards – the DB of PAYG – should be designed in a 
manner, which doesn’t hamper the effective functioning of the market. The rationale is 
that if the market becomes unsustainable, the fault is credited the distorting effect of too 
                                                 
 
34 Martin Feldstein is an American economist, who gained fame by a study of the adverse effects of taxes 
and government programs on the incentives to work, save and invest. He was later appointed as chairman 
of then U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers.  
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generous (state-runned) PAYG systems. The claim is also rooted in another neo-liberal 
view; that governments are inefficient in handling economic allocation.  
The ERT is seeking an extensive reform – close to a revolution – of European public 
pension systems and argues that the reform of public pension programmes would be 
best carried out through a co-ordinated approach at the European level: 
Worthwhile reform of public pension arrangements must be implemented across a 
broad front involving the European Union, Member States and social partners. (…) 
There cannot be identical reforms in each country. But there must be a common set of 
principles underlying reforms in each Member State if the reforms are to achieve 
common objectives. 
ERT 2000: 7 
The ERT called for a European effort in order to meet the challenges of the 
unsustainable and too generous PAYG systems. In October 2001, ERT issued a follow-
up report of their recommendations in which it was noted that reforms were progressing 
– but too slow and concluded that:  
Further consideration must also be given to the merits and feasibility of developing a 
wider set of indicators of budgetary sustainability at EU level, given the limitations of 
national accounts data it will be necessary for all countries in the SGP to provide 
information on the pace of reforms and on the effect that these have on the structural 
parameters of the economy. 
ERT 2001: 28 
The ERT’s Welfare Society Working Group was closed in 2002, shortly after the launch 
of the OMC of pensions in 2001.  
Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE) 
UNICE is one of the oldest lobbyist in the EU, founded in 1958, UNICE represents 
small, medium and large enterprises in Europe. Their members included industrial and 
employers federations from 33 countries35 and aim at achieving growth and 
competitiveness in Europe (UNICE 2004: 4). UNICE has also been an active player in 
                                                 
 
35 The Danish representation is Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (DA) and Dansk Industri (DI). 
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advocating the neo-liberal project for pensions in Europe. In 2001 it published the 
report "Strategy Paper on Sustainability Pensions", where they echoed the ERT’s 
opinion about pensions and competitiveness: 
The competitiveness of European companies, growth and employment in Europe are in 
danger if firms and workers have to cope with increasing labour costs due to a rising 
pension bill. 
UNICE 2001: 4 
UNICE concludes the report by recommending three initiatives at EU-level: 
1. Creating a strategy for dealing with ageing populations within BEPG 
2. Promote more efficient labour markets through the European Employment 
Strategy 
3. Monitor the evaluation of pension reforms in member states. 
(UNICE 2001: 30-31, own interpretation) 
Transnational business – PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
Organized business interests like the ERT are not alone in voicing its opinion – 
transnational businesses did also contribute to the debate on its own. 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers, one of the world’s largest companies in professional 
services, issued a booklet titled European Pensions and Savings Revolution (2000) in 
which they examined the projected development from 2000 to 2050 in Germany, UK, 
France and Italy. Trevor Llanwarne, a partner, summarized their two main 
recommendations in the 2001 The Urgent Need for Pension Reform; First, Setting a cost 
limit (akin to the Maastricht criteria) to public pension schemes for each year until 2050 
for all member states. Second, raising the retirement age to 70. Llanwarne concluded the 
paper with an outlook at the future: 
The future of the EU and the Euro in a competitive global economy is dependent on 
ensuring pension costs do not go too high. Limits must be set and action taken now. 
Nothing less is acceptable if we want the best for Europe. 
Llanwarne 2001 
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Friends of Europe  
Friends of Europe (FoE) is a Brussels-based think tank for EU policy analysis and 
debate. FoE claims to be independent of EU institutions and from national or political 
bias. In 2001 they arranged the conference Defusing Europe’s Timebomb where 
pensions were once more put on the agenda and discussed36. The keynote speaker was 
Carlo De Benedetti (ERT) and Commission officials were also participating37. The 
culmination of the conference was the closing statement by Commissioner Frits 
Bolkestein. Frits Bolkestein is a Dutch liberal politician who served as Commissioner 
for Internal Market, Taxation and Customs Union (2000-2004). He is the architect 
behind the Services Directive, which sparked immense controversy in March 2006, 
when it was adopted. He is also a member of the hardcore neo-liberal think tank Mont 
Pelerin Society. The Mont Pelerin Society was funded by Friedrich August von Hayek38 
in 1947 and continues to influence political and economic developments along neo-
liberal lines as a global network comprised by politicians, economists and journalists 
(Plehwe et al 2006: 28-45). Furthermore, Bolkestein has worked 16 years for Shell 
Group as a manager (1960-1976). At the conference, Bolkestein addressed the forum 
and explained how the European Commission already were handling the public 
pensions problem by focussing on economic measures (encouraging member states to 
respect their obligations under the SGP) and social measures (urging member states to 
change policies that disencourage elderly from retiring early – prior to the age of 65) 
(Bolkestein 2001). Bolkestein noted that the necessary pension reforms were a matter 
for member states and continued by summarizing the reforms taking place, pointing to a 
tendency:   
It is clear from what I have said concerning reforms already being carried out that there 
will be greater reliance put on funded pensions as part of the solution for sustainability 
                                                 
 
36 Invited guests at the 2001 conference also included Shell Pension Fund, Unilever, Federal Trust, 
Citibank, Deutsche Bank, EFRP, PriceWaterHouseCoopers plus representatives from the European 
Parliament amongst others.  
37 The conference aimed at addressing three questions; 1. How should EU member states tackle pension 
reform? 2. Will the pension crisis affect the competitiveness of Europe’s industry? 3. What is the EU 
dimension for pension reform? 
38 Former members of the Mont Pelerin Society include eight Nobel Prize winning economists such as 
Milton Friedman and George Stingler. Other members are renowned economists such as Lionel Robbins 
and Wilhelm Röpke as well as former Chancellor of West-Germany Ludwig Erhard, Czech president and 
former head of government Vaclav Klaus and former Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi.  
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Bolkestein 2001 
While this development was considered the way forward, Bolkestein did recognize that 
a debate on the social aspect had to take place within the “appropriate circles, including 
with the social partners” (Bolkestein 2001). But as Commissioner for the Internal 
Market, Taxation and Customs Union, this was not within his area of competence, he 
added. He did however present something from his area of competence, a proposal for a 
directive that would enhance the portability of supplementary pensions39. 
He rounded up his presentation of the Commission’s efforts by making an appeal to the 
forum: 
 “Let us work together to make them [the Commission’s efforts] succeed” 
Summary 
The end of the 1990s witnessed a rise of neo-liberals advocating pension reforms in 
Europe. Sparked by dramatic concepts such as ‘the pension time bomb’ and ‘the biggest 
challenge of our time’, the neo-liberal debate almost fed on itself in attempts to make 
public PAYG systems appear to be a danger to the economic stability in Europe. The 
demographic forecasts would result in excessive budget deficits in most member states, 
which again would harm the competitiveness of the EU as a global economy along with 
violating the member states’ obligations under the SGP. The answer to the puzzle is the 
reform of pension systems towards privately, funded systems, which is seen as more 
safe against the demographic pressure and beneficial for the Internal Market since new 
financial markets would arise. This is typical of the neo-liberal project; the unshakable 
belief that the emancipation of the European market forces through the promotion of 
funded pension schemes would without doubt eliminate the pension problem. This 
belief is also rooted in the neo-liberal perception of governments as unsuitable for 
economic allocation – perfectly illustrated by the ERT’s view of European PAYG 
systems as being too generous.  
One of the most significant actors advocating the neo-liberal project has been the ERT, 
whose recommendations – regarding the agreeing on common principles and achieving 
common objectives through the use of benchmarks – have been fully integrated in the 
                                                 
 
39 The Directive 2003/41/EC was adopted by the European Parliament and Council June 3rd 2003. 
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OMC of pensions, designed by the Council and Commission.  
Even though most of the neo-liberals recognized that reforms would have to be 
conducted by national governments, a distinctive feature of the debate is the request for 
a coordinating effort made at the European level. This project has been promoted by the 
Commission, who is invited to participate in various research projects and conferences 
like 'Defusing Europe’s Time Bomb' in 2001, where Commissioner Bolkestein 
supported the  neo-liberal view and encouraged further co-operation between organized 
business and the EU.  
 
8.2 TRACING THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 
In the previous sections we have accounted for the actors supporting the neo-liberal 
project, and how they have influenced the pension debate prior to the OMC of pensions. 
This section will go through the competing social democratic project by tracing the key 
actors actively involved in highlighting the social aspects of the pension puzzle. With 
reference to Van Apeldoorn’s analysis, in chapter 6 we identified the social democratic 
project as being articulated most strongly by Jacques Delors, having a focus on the 
‘European model of society’ prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Since then other actors has 
taken over the social concerns, and as this chapter will show, highlighted their wishes to 
secure the European welfare states against a neo-liberal agenda. The actors we have 
identified advocating the social democratic project in relations to pensions are; 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) - representing the workers in Europe, 
Social Platform - an umbrella organisation with focus on social protection, AGE - 
representing older people in Europe, and finally Frank Vandenbroucke - an Belgian 
Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions (1999-2003). 
ETUC – European Trade Union Confederation 
ETUC - established in 1973 - is the representation of 77 National Trade Union 
Confederations from 35 countries and 11 European Industry Federations with a total of 
60 million members. ETUC are one of the Social Partners and has thus direct 
representations to the various institutions in the EU – such as the Commission, 
Parliament and Council – and participate also in a number of advisory bodies including 
civil society committees connected to EPC and SPC. ETUC phrases their overall aim to 
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be: 
… to speak with a single voice, on behalf of the common interests of workers, at 
European level. Its prime objective is to promote the European Social Model and to 
work for the development of a united Europe of peace and stability where working 
people and their families can enjoy full human and civil rights and high living 
standards. The European Social Model embodies a society combining sustainable 
economic growth with ever-improving living and working standards. 
ETUC 2003 
ETUC represents the workers in Europe and emphasise the rights of the individual in 
obtaining a reasonable living standard as well as civil liberties. It is proponent of 
welfare states, where prosperity should benefit all in society. ETUC has a subdivision 
called FERPA (Fédération Européenne des Retraites et Personnes Agees or The 
European Federation of Retired and Older People) that represent retired workers and 
older people. It was formed in 1988 under the structures of ETUC, and became 
independent in 1993. ETUC and FERPA embrace the same Constitution, and can be 
said to share the same voice in concerns to pensions. 
 
Against the neo-liberal actors that we presented in the previous chapter, ETUC has 
taken another stance on the ‘problem of Europe’. In the publication Europe needs more 
flexible macroeconomic policies from 2005 ETUC makes it quite clear how they 
position themselves against the neo-liberal perceptions. They start out by summarising 
how their proponents tend to argue: 
Social benefit regimes are said to stifle the incentives to work and regulation protecting 
workers’ rights is accused of making it impossible for Europe to compete with low-
wage economies such as the new Eastern European member states or China. According 
to this view, the only way to improve Europe’s growth performance is to engage in 
‘structural reform’, to improve the ‘supply side’ of the economy, by cutting both 
welfare and workers’ rights. 
 
And ETUC continues with a critique of these arguments:  
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This approach is wrong. The reason for the five-year growth slump is not be found in 
too much social policy, but rather in a highly unbalanced macroeconomic policy 
regime. That means moving quickly and ruthlessly to fight inflation, and yet when 
economic activity is in trouble and confidence needs to be restored, the European 
Central Bank and finance ministers adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude and take half-
hearted measures. Such a policy regime necessarily produces prolonged downturns and 
short-lived recoveries. And this is exactly what recent experience shows us. 
ETUC 2005:1 
 
In these quotes it’s quite clear how ETUC dissociates from the neo-liberal supply-side 
oriented way of thinking, which in their view is dominating the European states and the 
ECB. What is needed is a renewal of macroeconomic policies, where stimulation of 
demand rather than supply should be pursued. They are thereby in favour of change 
from a mere Schumpeterian approach onto a Keynesian approach and in this way pursue 
full-employment. The member states are accused of wanting to set aside welfare and 
social rights in order to stimulate the supply-side – and hereby benefit the businesses on 
the expense of the workers. ETUC argues that the five years of economic failure in 
Europe must be evidence enough to call for renewal.   
 
As a key point, ETUC is firmly committed to public funded pension schemes, which in 
their view should be a fundamental element of retirement pensions (ETUC 2000: 
section 1.1). In their Resolution adopted in 2001, ETUC criticises the EPC reports on 
aging and economic consequences for being reflecting to simplistic simulations. 
Furthermore, ETUC stresses that even though the EPC reports are informative, it needs 
to be pointed out that they are not forecasts but mere projections. In addition, the 50 
year horizon makes it even more blurry (ETUC 2001: section 1). In relation to the EPC 
reports ETUC states in the Resolution: 
The ETUC does not ignore the impact of the ageing population on the financing of 
pension schemes both public and funded ones. However, the ETUC believes that it 
would be a mistake and over-simplistic to base any reforms solely on the financial 
consequences of the ageing population. The approach adopted must not disregard the 
social policy objectives which pension schemes reflect and must continue to reflect. 
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ETUC 2001: section 3 
ETUC calls for more focus on the social protection, but still acknowledges, that an 
increasing number of pensioners will have some economic impact on the member states. 
However, this must not worsen the situation for the pensioners. Hereby ETUC concerns 
the social concerns ahead of economic priorities.  
 
In relation to the establishment of OMC of pensions, ETUC saw SPC as an important 
player in regards to allowing social concerns in the field of pensions (Ibid: section 1). 
Before the Council decided on having EPC and SPC working jointly on the OMC of 
pensions, ETUC criticised on the lack of social aspect in the EPC reports – which they 
together with the member states considered wrongly measured in the EPC projections. 
Thus ETUC perhaps has had an influence on the process which led to the EPC/SPC co-
operation.  
 
Regarding the specific issue of pensions, a resolution was adopted in 2003 where 
specific demands on an adequate level of pension were set40. Aside from improved 
public funded pension systems – with particular emphasis on PAYG schemes and 
individual rights of sufficient benefits to obtain an independent life, FERPA demands 
“A minimum pension for retired workers equal to the minimum wage or equivalent to 
50% of per capita GDP” and “Minimum resources for older people equivalent to 40% 
of per capita GDP” (FERPA 2003). Opposite to many other actors in play 
ETUC/FERPA set up some clear cut specifications on the size of adequate pensions.    
Social Platform 
The Social Platform was established in 1995 and represents forty European NGOs, 
federations and networks working to promote the social dimension of the European 
Union. The organisation came to live in the context of a Green Paper on European 
Social Policy in November 1993 from the Commission, which was the first official 
document to deal explicitly with establishing a dialogue with NGOs. Members include 
organisations protecting rights of women, people with disabilities, people who are 
                                                 
 
40 At the fourth Congress for FERPA in Rome in 2003 
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unemployed, people affected by poverty, gays and lesbians, young people, children and 
families, social justice, homelessness, older people etc.41. In the final group AGE is the 
representative in Social Platform and thus voices the concerns in these matters. 
However, Social Platform has prior to the founding of AGE had some say in the matters 
of pensions in their responses to EU development on social protection. 
In 1998 Social Platform highlights their concerns regarding the single market and 
forthcoming EMU:   
The principles governing the single market, and in particular the general principle of 
free competition, have led to the growing dominance of the logic of the market. The 
principle of public intervention (and thus social policy), and the specific aspects of the 
non-profit making sector have been called into question in the name of economic 
liberalism.  
Social Platform 1998: 2 
Social Platform calls for caution, and that the social aspects must not be overrun by 
mere economic concerns. two years later in 2000 they express their view more explicitly 
in regards to pensions, where they fear for the development of private pensions schemes 
“to which many people do not have access” will entail a settling or even reduction in 
the basic pensions (Social Platform 2000: 9). The social democratic project is resembled 
in the fear for a Europe that focuses too much on the corporate world, competitiveness 
and economic constraints under SGP on the expense of protection of the people of 
Europe.  
AGE – Older People’s Platform 
AGE is a non-profit and non-governmental organisation founded in 2001 by European 
organisations that represent older people, in order to strengthen the cooperation of these 
different organisations at EU level. It has 140 members from almost all member states 
of the EU. AGE’s work embodies correspondence with their members, in order to get 
information on how the pension process is evolving in the different member states vis-à-
vis development at EU level. At the same time AGE returns opinions on Green Papers 
concerning their field of interest as well as arrange seminars for relevant actors, who 
                                                 
 
41 http://www.socialplatform.org 
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might have interest in their position. At EU level the Parliament is their primary source 
for exchange of opinions (cf. interview with Geert de Cock, April 2006).    
AGE’s main aims are: “…to voice and promote the interest of older people in the 
European Union and to raise awareness of the issues that concern them most.”42 AGE 
is funded by its members as well as from the Commission working particularly on  age 
discrimination under the Community Action Programme against discrimination. The 
vision for AGE is “ a society for people of all ages where individuals enjoy equal rights 
in terms of their living conditions, their economic situation, their participation as 
citizens and their access to goods and services.“ (AGE 2004: 2) 
 
In the field of pensions AGE has identified five key points they believe are vital for 
pension provisions in Europe: 
 
1. Ensure that older people have the right to a decent level of pension, giving 
them a fair share of society’s economic well-being, not just preventing outright 
poverty. To ensure this, a country needs a secure, universal, fully adequate 1st 
pillar pension, whether or not 2nd and 3rd pillar systems are further developed.  
2. Guarantee that 1st pillar pensions are indexed so as to ensure that pensioners 
keep up with progress in society’s prosperity.  
3. Ensure that individuals are able to obtain a high income replacement rate at re-
tirement. It requires an environment in which pensions are secure and pension 
schemes are transparent and subject to effective governance and regulation. 
The regulatory framework must allow workers to transfer their occupational 
and private pension entitlements between Member States  
4. Eliminate gender discrimination in pension systems and in the labour market, 
and ensure that time spent caring for children, the elderly, etc. gives pension 
entitlements under the first pillar system, and that pensions rights are individu-
alised. 
5. Allow and encourage older people to continue working for longer, outlaw age 
discrimination, promote lifelong learning, training, etc., and allow for gradual 
retirement.  
AGE 2003, own condensation 
                                                 
 
42 http://www.age-platform.org 
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Thus, AGE points to the social values and the right to obtain adequate pensions in order 
to maintain a decent living standard in retirement. At the same time equal rights for men 
and woman and across generations. Everybody in society should benefit from the 
welfare in society, and most important of all 1st pillar pensions schemes should be 
obtained no matter how other pension arrangements evolve. AGE also advocates the 
free movement of workers and their ability to obtain their pensions savings no matter 
where they decide to live. AGE also points to some of the major problems they find in 
Europe Pension systems today - problems like unequal right between men and woman, 
poverty among elderly and discrimination among generations in the workforce. It is 
quite clear that AGE’s major concerns rest on the social aspects. With the focus on 
adequacy and protection of social rights AGE are in line with the social democratic 
project that we have presented earlier in this project. AGE represent the voice of the 
retired who has to survive in society, and who needs the protection and security in daily 
life. In AGE’s point of view this is best accomplished through strong welfare systems 
that rely on redistributive policies in order to ensure social rights.  
Whereas ETUC showed a determined effort to set benchmarks on adequate pensions, 
AGE is more reluctant in this respect, which shows that the picture of a united social 
democratic project gets blurred, and at least in this case there is no consensus.   
Other prominent actors 
In order to cover the social democratic project and its influence, it is relevant to look at 
other prominent actors in the European debate. As Delors is no longer part of the EU 
debate it’s fair to say that there has been a lack since 1995 of charismatic and influential 
advocates for the social democratic project. However, in our research socialist and 
Belgian Minister Frank Vandenbroucke43 has come up as one of the key actors in 
defending the social dimension. According to Zeitlin (2005) Vandenbroucke was a key 
player in launching the social inclusion and pension processes during the Belgian 
                                                 
 
43 Vandenbroucke was Belgian Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions (1999-2003), Minister for 
Employment and Pensions (2003-2004) and currently Flemish minister of Education (2004- ). He is a 
member of the political party “Social Progressive Alternative” – formerly known as the Belgische 
Socialistische Partij 
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presidency in 2001 (Zeitlin 2005: 4f). 
In his ability as Belgian Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions he was the key speaker 
at the Conference on “Safe and Sustainable Pensions in Europe” in Stockholm, 4th of 
April 2001, which was organised during the Swedish Presidency. In his speech 
Vandenbroucke states:  
On the future of pensions, the debate is often conducted in a one-sided manner, 
focusing on the issue of financial sustainability of systems, excluding other equally 
important issues related to ensuring the positive social impact of pensions. The 
pensions challenge is not a financial challenge with some social constraints; it is a 
social challenge with financial constraints. 
Vandenbroucke 2001 
Vandenbroucke highlights that the rhetoric in the case of pensions tends to be given 
narrowly attention to the economic challenges, rather than both social and economic 
considerations. He argues that ideological discussions on public vs. private schemes are 
irrelevant, and the attention should rather be put on what pension schemes should 
achieve. His personal opinion – in line with the socialist party he presents – is an 
archetypical position in the social democratic project, which follows the other actors of 
the social democratic projects that we have presented in this chapter:   
 
… the second pillar should not replace the first pillar, which we consider the 
fundamental guarantee that everyone has access to a decent pension. 
Vandenbroucke 2001 
 
Not surprisingly Vandenbroucke favour that 1st pillar pensions schemes are to be 
obtained, if the social protection for the older people in Europe should be secured.   
The OMC of pension and the social democratic project 
We have identified some of the main actors who support more social values in 
policymaking – rather than hardcore economic speculation. What we need to emphasise 
is that the actors representing the social democratic project (at least those we have 
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mentioned) have all greeted the OMC of pensions as a positive development. Gabrielle 
Clotuche from ETUC finds the OMC on pensions beneficial since it probably is the 
only way to maintain legislation at member state level and at the same time have 
reflections on social protection in EU in the future (cf. interview with Gabrielle 
Clotuche, April 2006). That the OMC on pensions at least brings some focus on the 
issue of pensions seems to be the main reason for the positive attitude towards the 
OMC. As Geert de Cock puts it: 
If there wouldn't be any OMC of pensions there wouldn't be nothing. (…) The open in 
the OMC is relative in the name, but without that we would have a much harder time, at 
least now we can refer to social inclusion etc.  
Interview with Geert de Cock from AGE: April 2006 
This reflects a rather functional answer; that the OMC may not be optimal for these 
actors, but in lack of the better, these actors adapt to these new developments, and hope 
to get the best out of it, by maybe being heard and hold the politicians and institutions 
accountable to the objectives of the OMC. With the view that it is utopia that the 
sovereignty on public funded pension policies will be taken from the member states and 
into EU legislation, the OMC on pensions becomes the alternative where pensions at 
least are given attention.  
Summary 
In this chapter we have pinpointed some of the actors who can be said to fit the social 
democratic ideal type. They all represent the social democratic project by their primary 
interest in securing the individuals right to a decent living standard and hereby adequate 
pensions. The solutions in doing this rely heavily on strong 1st pillar pension systems 
but also on equal right between men and woman in the pension systems. The social 
democratic project points to an increasing attention on the sustainability and worry that 
this rhetoric overrules the regards to social protection and cohesion of the welfare states 
in Europe. By emphasising 1st pillar pensions the social democratic project thereby also 
advocates for national solutions. In this way the struggle between the neo-liberal project 
and the social-democratic project implicitly becomes a struggle of more or less member 
state sovereignty, as the neo-liberal project advocates more 2nd and 3rd pillar pensions 
and more free market. The neo-liberal solutions can therefore well fit in to the 
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framework in the EU, whereas the social-democratic solutions fit better in the national 
states’ framework. 
The social democratic project talks for a Keynesian way of managing the member states 
where the demand side should be favoured in order to create employment and hereby 
secure the social protection of the welfare state. The logic of the market should not take 
the control. They resent a Schumpeterian way of thinking, which emphasises workfare, 
as it takes the focus from the social aspects, in order to benefit the corporate world on 
the expense of the individuals in Europe. 
What identifies the social democratic project is mere reaction than action, as they very 
clearly describe what they prefer and not prefer, but actual reform proposals or social 
democratic solutions are missing.   
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9 Interest representation in the OMC of pensions 
 
The aim of this chapter is to draw a picture of how the ideological and material 
struggles over the open coordination of pension reforms – but also about European 
integration in general – have been institutionalised into a polity and a policy mode 
specific to the OMC of pensions. We will do this by analysing the extent to which the 
different relevant social actors taking an interest in the OMC of pensions, try to 
influence the course of the whole process and whether they are being successful or not 
in gaining any influence. By doing this we will attempt to outline formal and informal 
networks working around the OMC of pensions, in order to asses the dynamics driving 
the process now and in the future. We build this part of the analysis on the assumption 
that informal rules of interaction are just as important as - or maybe even more 
important than - the formal rules surrounding policy processes (Jachtenfuchs and 
Kohler-Koch 2004: 100). 
9.1 INSTITUTIONALISED BALANCE? 
The important developments in the OMC of pensions indeed seems to be happening in 
the cooperation or rather struggle between the EPC and the SPC, respectively working 
under DG ECFIN and DG EMPL, and thus implicitly also the ECOFIN Council and the 
Council of ministers for Social Affairs. In the day-to-day monitoring of member state 
performances etc. these two committees represent the attempt to balance the economic 
vs. the social objectives, or in at least they are often portrayed as embodying the 
struggle between the neo-liberal and the social democratic projects, which are at stake in 
the OMC of pensions. As we will show and discuss in the subsequent this is in fact a 
misleading version of reality, reflecting a case of embedded neo-liberalism.  
 
Today there seems to be a consensus between these two committees on the objectives 
and the indicators, including some of the problems with setting up indicators for 
measuring the adequacy of social provisions. However, it has indeed not always been 
like this. The EPC started working on the issue of pension reforms as far back as 1997, 
where it approached the issue from an exclusively financial sustainability angle. Which 
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we argue gave them a substantial momentum in gathering information and argument 
about the issue, compared to the SPC. In doing so EPC more or less echoed the neo-
liberal project's punch lines about the ageing populations potentially causing major 
problems for public finances, unless reforms made sure that future pensions were 
funded, and that people would retire later than today's average age of retirement. 
Another recommendation was to move away from solidarity-based pension schemes 
towards more individual contributions (Pochet and Natali 2004: 10). In an EPC progress 
report to the ECOFIN Council in 2000, the recommendations were quite clear:  
 
1) Containments of benefits to guarantee solvency of PAYG, and delay retirement.  
2) Decrease Public debt.  
3) Strengthen the connection between social contribution and benefits at individual 
level.  
4) Support the role of funded schemes (EPC 2000: 8) . 
 
These initial steps to frame the issue within a European context, was criticised for being 
too biased and prompted the Council of ministers for Social Affairs to take action. 
Given the fact that pensions are their responsibility within the member states, and they 
had not been included in the deliberations leading up to the first EPC report on the 
pension issue. The response was to set up SPC, which was given the task to make a 
report on the social aspects of pensions (Pochet and Natali 2004: 12). Eventually the 
two committees were given the task to cooperate on setting up common objectives and 
later on indicators for the pension area. The 11 objectives somehow seem to reflect a 
compromise between the two committees, but also an attempt to make the OMC of 
pensions acceptable for the member states – especially viewed on the background of the 
critique aimed at EPC's previous recommendations. Thus, the 11 objectives reflects as 
much political struggle over pension policy priorities between member states, as it 
reflects struggles internally in the EU (Schludi 2003:34). 
 
In our introduction to the whole OMC-process we indicated that the EPC and SPC had 
its difficulties in setting up performance indicators for each of the 11 objectives. In the 
original time schedule indicators should have been commonly agreed upon by March 
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2002 at the Barcelona European Council, but this was delayed until 2004. One of the 
reasons for these difficulties is to be found in the technical problems in creating reliable 
and comparable indicators that should cover a time span of 50 years. At the same time 
there are reasons to believe that the rather vague formulation of the 11 objectives causes 
problems, since it can be difficult to pinpoint what measurable aims the objectives 
actually seeks to fulfil. E.g. the wording of objective 3 is: “Promote solidarity between 
generations” and of objective 7: “Ensure that pension provisions and reforms maintain 
a fair balance between the active and the retired by not overburdening the former and 
by maintaining adequate pensions for the latter” (SPC and EPC 2001). These are good 
examples of diffuse formulations, without further specification, explanations or targets 
to be reached (Schludi 2003:31).We will return to the question of some of these 
methodological problems, as well as a discussion of whether this presents a balanced 
compromise or not in the subsequent chapter. 
9.2 THE COMMISSION – THE ENGINE ROOM  
The members of the SPC are Commission staff from DG EMPL and member state 
representatives mainly from ministries for social affairs. The EPC consists of 
Commission staff from DG ECFIN plus member state representatives from the 
ministries for finance; furthermore there are also representatives from the ECB in the 
committee. These two committees are vital in the process because they draft the 
evaluation reports on the basis of the NSRs. They are also supposed to develop 
indicators relevant for their own area of responsibility. That means that EPC is 
responsible for working out indicators to measure the long-term financial sustainability 
of pension systems in member states, and SPC works on indicators for the adequacy and 
adaptability of pension systems44. The Commission clearly takes the centre stage in the 
committee work because it hosts the secretariat of the two committees; it arranges the 
committee meetings and drafts the reports that is negotiated at the meetings; and it is 
supposed to monitor the member states’ development on the pension area. Furthermore 
the Commission should also facilitate peer review processes if this is deemed necessary. 
This gives the Commission a somewhat powerful position with relation to the direction 
                                                 
 
44 The job of setting up indicators is mainly done in the Ageing Working Group  (AWG) under EPC and 
in the Indicator Sub-Group (ISG) under the SPC. 
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of the work towards reaching the common objectives in the OMC of pensions. In this 
regard one could say that the Commission works as a kind of extended agenda setter, 
which we would argue is a powerful position, especially when e.g. SPC-meetings are 
mainly used for discussing the specific wording of reports and texts, drafted by the 
Commission (cf. interview Jørgen Witsø-Lund). Officially the Commission share most 
of these responsibilities with the Council, but the Commission is definitely "the engine 
room" in this process, as a member state representative in the SPC puts it (cf. interview 
with Jørgen Witsø-Lund45). 
9.3 THE PRIMACY OF THE MEMBER STATES 
In the report establishing the OMC of pensions from 2001, it is noted that the 
Commission "liaises with European Social Partners and relevant NGOs" (EPC and 
SPC 2001). However it is not clear at all in which connection this should be done or 
which purpose it should serve. There is no explicit obligation to make consultations 
with civil society with regards to the OMC of pensions. An exception could be the 11th 
objective where it is stated that the OMC should "Promote the broadest possible 
consensus regarding pension policies and reforms" (SPC and EPC 2001), which can be 
interpreted as an encouragement to involve interest groups, however mainly with the 
purpose of ensuring their acceptance of the process. This blurs the ties between the 
officials and interest groups a lot and makes the networking almost exclusively 
informal. This is partly due to the fact that the OMC of pensions is purely member state 
driven, when it comes to legal competencies. This means that the Commission has to be 
cautious with its recommendations, or in the case of the OMC of pensions, in its 
outlining of future challenges for the member states. In addition the European 
Parliament is also left completely outside the process, with no role to play except from 
"being kept informed by the Council and the (...) Commission" (SPC and EPC 2001). 
From a member state perspective it also seems unlikely that the EP will have a say in 
the OMC of pensions in the future. The OMC is seen as a purely intergovernmental 
process and as such "the EP should not be discussing internal Danish social policy 
                                                 
 
45 The words of Mr. Witsø-Lund were in this context as follows: "Der sker det at til møderne er der lavet 
et oplæg af sekretariatet som er Kommissionen. Altså uden Kommissionen ville det her ikke kunne lade 
sig gøre for at sige det råt og brutalt. Kommissionen er maskinrummet for det her." 
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affairs, we haven't come that far yet" as a Danish representative in SPC put it (cf. 
interview with Jørgen Witsø-Lund, our own free interpretation46).  
 
That "the OMC is a government exercise" (Chris Verhaegen, April 2006) is also the 
message the European interest groups seem to have accepted, however they still lobby 
the Commission around some of the issues concerning the OMC of pensions, although 
they will have to do this on a more informal basis. Member state representatives thus 
become important targets for lobbyism. This is mainly taking place on the national 
levels, where national associations try to influence specific welfare reforms in the single 
member state. National lobbying is not as such an issue in our research, instead we 
focus on the European political scene emphasising the actors applying a more global or 
European perspective on things. This is what we return to in the following sections. 
 
With regards to the member state input to the two committees, the national 
representatives - mainly from the ministries for social and financial affairs - are often 
portrayed as representing the social vs. the economic/financial aspects of the issue. 
However this picture is quite blurred, due to the fact that member state representatives 
in the SPC often, take a common national stance on the entire process, together with 
their compatriots in the EPC (cf. interview with Jørgen Witsø-Lund and Ole 
Kjærgaard). This should be no big surprise that national governments try to adopt a 
somehow coherent stance, in order to further 'the national interests', but it is important 
to keep in mind before making claims about the SPC's role as a social actor exclusively 
furthering the social democratic project. Quite a substantial part of the SPC members 
might in fact have been put there, with the goal of furthering a neo-liberal agenda, 
depending on 'the national interests'. The same goes for the national representatives in 
EPC, who could (at least in theory) favour a social-democratic approach to pension 
reforms. We would argue that the contemporary truce or consensus between the SPC 
and the EPC can fruitfully be seen in this light. The concept of 'assimilation' is hardly 
even necessary to describe the embedded neo-liberalism then, because the social-
                                                 
 
46 The full wording in Danish are as follows: "EP skal ikke sidde og debatere intern dansk socialpolitik. 
Så langt er vi ikke nået." 
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democratic project is more or less subordinated to the neo-liberal in the outset. 
9.4 THE SOCIAL ACTORS LOBBYING THE EPC 
With regards to consultations with civil society EPC and DG ECFIN apparently does 
not consult anyone. They however see their jobs with working on indicators and 
evaluating the development as a purely technical matter (cf. interview with Jan Høst-
Schmidt and Aino Salomäki). This we argue reflects a pure case of new-
constitutionalism as referred to in chapter 6. Because the work in the EPC is highly 
political in the respect that it involves agreeing on common goals and objectives for 
society as well as on the indicators to measure the development towards these goals. 
This work has been buried in a pile of technicalities making it look like mere numbers 
and figures, obscuring the ideology surrounding the issues dealt with. We find no reason 
to doubt that the EPC-members see themselves as pure technocrats, but in fact they are 
working with some of the corner stones of politics namely economic objectives and 
implicitly how to distribute wealth in society. Of course these technocrats see the OMC-
process as not leading to any specific policies. However in the long run, we argue that 
setting up specific goals and defining future problems can indeed lead to changes in 
pension systems. The point is that these processes have indeed been removed from 
'broad political accountability' (cf. Gill 1998), now almost exclusively run by 
bureaucrats, which gives the process very limited 'input legitimacy'47. 
 
The European Central Bank is an important EU-level institution taking a specific 
                                                 
 
47A central component of any political system is its legitimacy, which is an aspect the EU system has 
been struggling with for a long time. In this regard we need to distinguish between input and output 
legitimacy. The Commission is drafting most proposals for EU-legislation, as well as reports and 
recommendations in the OMC processes, but it has little or no democratic input, thus Commission 
proposals has little input legitimacy. The way it can try to compensate for this is to incorporate a broad 
range of interests from civil society into the proposals for legislation. In the same way national officials in 
the Council will need some kind of information about the overall national interests to rightfully claim to 
be serving them.  
On the other hand policies may be democratically decided and have incorporated the encompassing 
interest of most of society, still though this is not a guarantee for the policy to be successful in real life. If 
a policy turns out not to deliver what was promised, it will have no output legitimacy. Thus expert 
knowledge of some kind might be needed in order to make policies technically fit for conditions external 
to the bureaucracy and the legislature (Bouwen 2002: 371). The point here is that in order to reach the 
anticipated objectives with a certain policy, legislators and bureaucrats will usually have to consider: 
whether the instruments applied are fit for the specific purpose, as well as possible unintended 
consequences by applying the specific instrument.  
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interest in the OMC of pensions, or at least in the economic and financial aspects of the 
process. The ECB's main concerns are the sustainability of PAYG pension systems and 
the possible effects on public budgets. Quite unsurprisingly the recommendations from 
the ECB focus on lowering public debt ratios and moving over to more funded pension 
schemes. The underlying concern seems to be the future prospects for people to 
consume or save having possible effects on interest rates and the public finances. 
(Pochet and Natali 2004: 11) In the EPC there seems to be consensus on some of these 
overall objectives. At least according to Jan Høst-Schmidt and Aino Salomäki from the 
EPC it hardly ever comes to a vote in the EPC, and the ECB allegedly plays no bigger 
role than any other EPC-member. Of course there could be a number of reasons for the 
ECB to make a modest appearance in the EPC, but one of them could in fact be that 
things are going their way. At least we find it quite plausible that the ECB would 
strongly object if developments and recommendations were not in line with especially 
the SGP. On the other hand the ECB also has an upper hand when it comes to a process 
like the SGP, because it is indeed backed by options for sanctions, contrary to the OMC. 
 
Today there are limited contacts between civil society and EPC. This seems to have 
been substantially different in the past, at least in the first phases of the OMC of 
pensions. The credit for the pensions issue ending up on the agenda of the EU, can to a 
very large extent be ascribed the efforts of neo-liberal actors like e.g. Federal Trust and 
the ERT as accounted for in a previous chapter. Here we also accounted for some of the 
close but informal ties between the Commission at large and these neo-liberal actors, 
which indeed seem to have been a major driving force behind the initiation of the OMC 
of pensions. In fact ERT has also been a significant advocate of applying benchmarking 
as governance tool in the EU. 
 
The keyword in describing the Lisbon Strategy has been ‘competitiveness’, which 
according to Van Apeldoorn can be traced back to ERT’s influence at EU level. The 
Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG)  was set up by the Commission in 1995, just 
one year after ERT proposed such a group in its report Beating the Crisis (Van 
Apeldoorn 2002: 175). In order to make competitiveness operational, ERT together with 
CAG suggested benchmarking as the tool for policymakers to measure competitiveness, 
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and in continuation of this, ERT held several seminars with the Commission and 
officials from member state governments to advocate the use of benchmarks. It is fair to 
say that ERT succeeded. According to Van Apeldoorn both members of the 
Commission and the Council acknowledge that the concept of benchmarking has come 
to attention because of the work of ERT (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 177). Several initiatives 
were launched, including the “High Level Group on Benchmarking” (HLGB) in 1997 - 
a group of ‘experts’ from the industry (including a member of ERT), who should 
identify weaknesses and inefficiencies at corporate, sectoral and public policy levels 
within the EU (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 177). In their first report HLGB stated that the 
aim of benchmarking and comparisons is to promote structural reform in order to meet 
the globalization challenges which includes ”further liberalisation, privatisation …, 
more flexible labour laws, lower government subsidies, etc.” (HLGB in Van Apeldoorn 
2002: 177).    
On the basis of Van Apeldoorn’s findings we find it quite evident that the ERT’s 
lobbying prior to the Lisbon Strategy has had a strong influence on benchmark’s 
entrance as a tool of governance, known as OMC. Not only ERT’s strong voice on 
competitiveness has been echoed in the Commission, but also benchmarking as the 
operational part has impressed the Commission – and later the Council – to an extent 
where it has been incorporated as a polity known as OMC. On top of this come the 
efforts from these neo-liberal actors to frame the pensions issue as a European problem, 
leading to the initiation of the OMC of pensions. 
 
As noted above the ERT closed down its working group dealing with pension reforms, 
indicating that their efforts had more or less been successful. The process was rolling 
and all that was left, was to make it acceptable to member states and the European 
populations, which we see as the job of the Commission, mainly the SPC. We argue that 
the informal consultation of social actors by the SPC, should partly be seen in this light. 
9.5 ORGANISED INTERESTS AND THE SPC 
When addressing the issue of pension reforms from a social democratic perspective, 
social actors on the European level concentrate on lobbying the SPC, even though it is 
uncertain whether this will pay off in any way. In this regard the European Social 
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Partners have gained a high position. This means that approximately before every third 
meeting in the SPC, the Social Partners are invited to an informal meeting with the 
Commission. Before these informal consultations the Social Partners try to develop a 
common standpoint on which they can ground their arguments vis-à-vis the 
Commission (cf. interview with Gabrielle Clotuche, April 2006). It is questionable 
whether social democratic ETUC can agree with especially neo-liberal UNICE. As such 
it seems quite peculiar that e.g. UNICE, is consulted by the SPC, which was apparently 
set up to pose a counterweight to the financial framing of the 'pension’s problem' by the 
EPC.  
As we accounted for in a previous chapter this can hardly be characterized as the aim of 
UNICE. E.g. the social democratic; AGE and ETUC etc. are not being consulted by the 
EPC. Of course corporatist traditions from the member states, where the labour market 
parties are being consulted on a regular basis, influence the way the EU is being 
structured, but in this case it gives a bias. The 'internal' struggle between the Social 
Partners is also reflected in the fact that since the establishment of the Social Dialogue 
where the Social Partners gained the abovementioned status as co-legislators, they have 
only been capable of agreeing on minor provisions (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 
2004: 106). Still though ETUC praises its own achievements with regards to the Social 
Dialogue (See e.g. ETUC 2004), the question is how much they have in reality 
achieved. This indeed seems to be the central problem that ETUC and other socially 
oriented actors are struggling with. They seem locked into an unfavourable position, or 
as Bieling 2001 puts it: 
The fundamental problem is that they have subjected themselves almost 
unconditionally to the prevailing functionalist (i.e., neo-liberal and technocratic) path of 
European integration. This might have made possible some involvement of trade unions 
in the process of European decision making. Nevertheless, this strategic orientation also 
implies some often ignored, but remarkable, political costs. With respect to further 
political initiatives, it may turn out to be a huge burden as the recognition, legitimacy 
and influence of the ETUC becomes derived more from European institutions (such as 
the Commission) than from its own affiliations and their rank an file. 
Bieling 2001: 112 
Thus it seems plausible that ETUC has been assimilated into a form of embedded neo-
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liberalism, where they have been awarded a high rank, with very limited abilities to 
influence the course of things. In order to progress on some of their social objectives, 
they have to accept the economic imperatives inherent in the process, which they also 
seem to be fully aware of (cf. interview with Gabrielle Clotuche, April 2006). The 
question is still how much they are actually able to gain, by submitting to the neo-liberal 
agenda. And as such it could look like they are rubber stamping policies which is 
ultimately not in the interest of their members. This is perhaps also the reason why they 
are consulted on a regular basis after all, because they can to some extent make their 
members fall in to line. But as Bieling also points out ETUC will eventually have to 
review its position and ask from where it should derive its legitimacy; from below via 
the members; or from above; through the Commission? 
 
Another aspect of ETUC’s role with regards to the OMC of pensions is the struggle 
between ETUC’s ‘European Federation for Retired and Older People’ - FERPA - and 
AGE – ‘The European Older Peoples' Platform’. FERPA seems to have interpreted the 
founding of AGE in 2001 as a possible threat to their legitimacy as the voice of the 
older people in Europe - perhaps because FERPA qua ETUC's position has taken a seat 
at the 'high table' together with the other Social Partners. The consequence is that today 
the two organisations lobby for the rights of older people in Europe, without 
cooperating at all (cf. interviews with Geert de Cock and Gabrielle Clotuche, both April 
2006). This will supposedly weaken the social democratic project, because there is no 
real coherence in the approach and the messages. As long as two of the organisations 
most eager to further the social democratic project - on the pensions area - in one way or 
the other, cannot find common ground - partly due to personal quarrels - it will weaken 
their possibility to set up a serious counter hegemonic project to oppose the neo-liberal 
agenda. 
 
The European Older Peoples' Platform, AGE and to a limited extent its superior 
umbrella organisation the Platform of European Social NGOs, try to lobby the SPC e.g. 
in order to still keep a role for 1st pillar pension systems as accounted for in the previous 
chapter. However they have a hard time coming through with their messages. In fact 
they have internal problems with basic matters, such as agreeing on a common agenda 
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amongst its members. The fact that the OMC is exclusively a member state process 
naturally also seems to present a significant barrier for AGE. With regards to the 
internal decision making in AGE, the limited capacity of the organisation makes it hard 
to even come up with some sort of 'information about the European encompassing 
interests' (Bouwen 2002: 369) of the older people; the member associations are very 
different and usually have a limited capacity as well. In relation to the second round of 
NSRs in 2005, AGE tried to gather the opinions of their members, and compile it into a 
coherent opinion of the European older peoples' organisations. And they also tried to 
urge their members to go to their national ministries and let them know what their 
interests were. But, as Geert de Cock, policy officer in AGE puts it; "we see that even 
our own members are not really interested". Thus for various reasons the information 
that AGE is able to deliver, is not particularly valuable for the Commission. This is a 
fact that the people in AGE seem to be aware of, and therefore they are working hard to 
deal with it (cf. interview with Geert de Cock). Still though they accept the agenda and 
try to work inside the framework of the OMC of pensions, even though as in the words 
of Geert de Cock "you can have a very bad process (...) but still have interesting 
content. I think you can move forward on very narrow policy areas." So just like the 
trade unions, AGE seems to be locked into an unfavourable position, having to accept 
the agenda, while not really being able to influence it.  
 
The Commission on the other hand seems to use organisations like AGE for a very 
specific purpose. Even though AGE originally wasn't supposed to take an interest in the 
OMC of pensions, from a Commission point of view there might have been other 
motives behind the funding of an NGO like AGE. The Commission seems to willingly 
feed AGE with information about developments in the OMC, possibly because 
(...) they are interested in the process being more visible at the national level, the more 
people are active at the national level on this OMC, the more member states will take it 
serious and maybe make policies and rely on the process to draft policies. 
Geert de Cock, April 2006 
The Commission seems to use the NGOs and other Euro-organisations for passing 
down information to their national members. In this way the Commission can 
  
 
 
 
90
circumvent and challenge the 'gatekeeper-role' of national governments (Börzel 1997: 
11). In the OMC where reforms are to be taking place at the national level, this can 
indeed be a powerful tool for the Commission to indirectly - to a certain extent - be able 
to mobilise social forces within the member states. We would not be so blunt as to call 
these Commission funded NGOs 'puppets of the Commission', but this seems to be the 
impression of the government representatives, who see it as a more or less 'unholy 
symbiosis' between the Commission and these NGOs (cf. interview with Jørgen Witsø-
Lund, May 200648). A substantial part of AGE's lobby-activities are in fact to try to 
mobilise its national members to make their voices heard at the national level, e.g. with 
regards to the NSRs. In this sense AGE and other NGOs can be a valuable resource for 
the OMC process, which gains momentum and vitality from a raised awareness of it at 
the national levels. 
9.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have showed how the most powerful neo-liberal actors (e.g. ERT) are 
not trying to influence the course of the OMC of pensions very much anymore. 
However they can take a substantial part of the credit for the issue of pension reforms 
ending up on the EU-agenda, and they were also some of the main architects behind the 
design of the OMC of pensions.  
The EPC and SPC seems at first sight to be striking a balance between the financial and 
social concerns related to pension reforms. However we would argue that the SPC 
seems to be just a weak proxy for a real counterweight to the EPC. And we would like 
to questions whether SPC poses any alternative to the neo-liberal agenda at all, or if it 
was just set up to make it look like it. At least it looks like the SPC today is taking an 
exposed position, consulting the Social Partners and social NGOs, because it is not 
possible to influence the process very much after all. Today the partnership and consent 
of civil society at large is not so much needed to adapt the reforms to the interests of 
civil society, but in order to legitimise the reform processes. It seems to be a clear cut 
case of ‘assimilation’ (cf. chapter 2), where the concerns of the social democratic 
                                                 
 
48The words of Mr. Witsø-Lund were in this context as follows: "Jeg er ikke i tvivl om at de der 
organisationer de får penge af Kommissionen. Det er hele deres eksistensgrundlag. Og dermed vil de jo 
også gerne sige hvad kommissionen kan li' at høre. Så det er en mere eller mindre uhellig symbiose 
mellem NGOer og kommissionen." 
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project are indeed included in the process, but inferior to the neo-liberal and financial 
objectives guiding the OMC of pensions. Thus the neo-liberal project becomes 
embedded. In the words of a Danish representative in the SPC puts it: “in order to make 
it all easier digestible” (Jørgen Witsø-Lund, April 2006, our own free translation49), 
and in the case of the OMC of pensions it has been institutionalised with the EPC and 
SPC. 
 
                                                 
 
49 The words of Mr. Witsø-Lund were in this context as follows ”Og vi [SPC] blev sat i verden for at 
afbalancere unionens vækst og beskæftigelsesteori eller strategi for at sikre at den sociale dimension ikke 
bliver glemt – for at gøre det hele lidt mere spiseligt.” 
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10 The neo-liberal purpose with the OMC of pensions 
 
In chapter 7 we have described the OMC of pensions; procedures around it and 
developments since its initiation; plus the projects that struggle for hegemony within the 
process. This next section will examine how the struggle has been institutionalised in 
the OMC of pensions. We will start by taking a critical view on the use of benchmarks 
in the field of social policy. With its roots in the corporate sphere, it is distinctive that 
benchmarking should be adaptable to the field of social policy in measuring welfare 
systems at large. Next we will take a critical view on the framework of the OMC of 
pensions and its aim at pointing to ‘best practices’ among the member states. This, we 
argue, is inherently a neo-liberal governance-strategy. Hence it is contributing to 
maintaining and institutionalising the neo-liberal dominance in the EU. Nevertheless the 
OMC of pensions at the same time pretends to be balanced. 
10.1 BENCHMARKING ON SOCIAL POLICIES  
The idea of benchmarking has its roots in the corporate world as a tool for comparing 
performances among companies, with the aim to improve own performance by learning 
from best practices. The overall goal for the private business enterprises is not 
surprisingly to maximize profit, whereby the use of benchmarks are used to optimize 
productivity and efficiency in order to achieve better economic results (Schludi 2003: 
13, 16). Benchmarks have entered the political arena, and have become a recognized 
tool to compare performance within countries (e.g. in areas such as health care) as well 
as performance comparisons between different countries. International institutions like 
the OECD and WTO are excellent examples of how benchmarks and international 
comparisons of best practice have become a part of the political reality throughout the 
world (Atkinson et al. 2002: 1). In line with the aims of the Lisbon Strategy, 
benchmarking in the political sphere aims ultimately at policy alignment – but the road 
to this harmonization, is a process “by which knowledge about policies and institutional 
arrangements in place is borrowed to inform, structure and legitimize policy change 
elsewhere” (Dyson in Schludi 2003: 13).  
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When it comes to measuring the performance of social policies there is no definitive 
way in doing so. A definition of ‘best practice’ will always be biased towards some 
orientation - and in the case of welfare policies be build on political ideology. 
According to Schludi (2003) it is mistaken image that ‘best practices’ in social policies 
can be defined in a pure apolitical and technical manner (Schludi 2003: 17). This 
observation is very much in line with our view, that the creation of benchmarks and 
‘best practices’ will have some social purpose for some on the expense of others – as 
argued in our theoretical chapter. When using benchmarks and indicators in the 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy and more specifically in the OMC of pensions, the 
benchmarks and indicators are constraining what are the possible outcomes of the 
policies. 
  
Another problem of benchmarking in the area of pensions is agreeing on a common 
language. If member states ascribe different meanings to commonly agreed concepts, 
comparisons will make very little sense, if any at all. This is apparently a big problem 
with the OMC of pensions when member states simply do not speak about the same 
thing when e.g. applying the three-pillar-typology used to describe pension systems (cf. 
interview with Jeroen Clicq, April 2006). According to the EFRP this is one of the 
biggest obstacles for a successful process, in terms of facilitating meaningful reporting, 
learning and peer-review processes etc. 
 
Schludi argues that a practical problem with the use of benchmarks in the field of social 
policies is that the policy makers have to pursue several goals at the same time, contrary 
to the main focus on profit-maximization in the corporate world. Most policy goals can 
in fact be characterised as trade-offs e.g. in the case of pensions where the aspirations 
for the policymakers can be both to ensure a high level of social protection for the 
retired, but at the same time limit the tax burden for the working population. In this 
respect the OMC of pensions - as a comparative tool of welfare state performance - 
becomes a tool to affect the different positions on sound trade-offs in the policy making 
rather than giving solutions that secure social welfare (Schludi 2003: 16).  
 
In this way we would argue the OMC as governance tool is not causing the process to 
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move closer to striking a balance between the two competing projects, because it is a 
neo-liberal governance tool or a mode of ‘advanced liberal government’ (Haahr 2004) 
in itself. It emphasises the freedom for - in our case -member states to choose whatever 
fits them the best. On the other hand, this is a conditioned and structured freedom, that 
transforms the actors inside the process into rational and calculating beings (Haahr 
2004: 219) sometimes also termed ‘Homo oeconomicus’ (see Nielsen 2006: 9). In this 
way the neo-liberal conception of ‘freedom’ secured through political governance is 
inherently ambivalent, because it on the one hand sets the actors free, but on the other 
hand it turns them into "a potential technical instrument in the achievement of 
governmental purposes and objectives, (...) an entity which can be constructed and 
shaped by governmental practices" (Haahr 2006: 216). In this context it does not make 
a difference that the primary social entities in the OMC of pension are governments 
instead of individual human beings. The OMC is thus build on a narrative of 
‘competitive self-improvement’ (Haahr 2006: 223), which is also present in the 
Schumpeterian conception of e.g. ‘creative destruction’. It implies that the ‘societal 
machinery’ will be able to perform better if it is being exposed to competition. The 
‘telos’ allegedly brings - apart from more prosperity – greater social cohesion and 
inclusion. However the inclusion and cohesion is in this context closely related to the 
labour market, where the vision is "society as an economy of employed and self-
employed individuals" (Haahr 2006: 225). Thus we are essentially dealing with the issue 
of workfare as opposed to welfare, which is a part of the neo-liberal agenda, as we have 
already touched upon previously.  
 
Furthermore the regular reporting to - and monitoring of member state performances by 
- the Commission and eventually other member states through peer review processes, 
can be seen as a sophisticated mode of surveillance. Resembling a ‘panopticon’ “which 
works through the minds of the inmates” it “serves to induce a certain consciousness 
and behaviour by the sheer presence of surveillance” (Haahr 2006: 220), so it doesn’t 
work through overt pressure or coercion. That we are dealing with a conditioned and 
structured freedom seems rather obvious. In line with contemporary streams of 
governance-studies the argument is that there is not necessarily a ‘sovereign’ exercising 
power through the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion in the Weberian sense, 
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but still we are dealing with relations of power. In this context we hold that the 
Focauldian power-perspective applied by Haahr, which sees power as not just repressive 
but also eventually a productive feature of all social relations is well-fit for exploring 
how power-structures enables and disciplines its subjects into a certain ‘regime of 
truth’50 (Haahr 2006). This is nearly the same as the ‘strategic selectivity’ of the system, 
which we are dealing with, and thus we can fruitfully draw on his conclusions, as we 
have done here51. However the neo-Gramscian analytical concepts and research agenda 
we are applying goes further and also asks why the system eventually was designed as it 
is (cf. the ideological struggles accounted for above).  
10.2 OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS 
After the mutual agreement in 2001 by the European Council to adopt the 11 objectives, 
the next step was to create indicators that all member states equally could agree on. 
How to define appropriate indicators gives reason for continuous political struggles as 
well as struggles between the social concerns and economic priorities within EU. As we 
have stated earlier in this chapter, benchmarking and use of indicators will be 
ideologically bound, and thus the creation of indicators for the OMC of pensions will 
reflect ideological struggles between the different actors in play – and ultimately ‘best 
practice’ becomes a reflection of the hegemonic project.  
 
In the case of OMC of pensions the balance between sustainability and adequacy is 
taken for granted, which can be seen explicitly in the Joint report by the Commission 
and Council (2003): 
Member States are fully aware of the interdependence between financial sustainability 
                                                 
 
50 In this case the embedded neo-liberal paradigm and its rights and wrongs, e.g. the firm belief in the 
inevitability of globalisation which makes competitiveness an imperative for everybody. Also the ones 
who try to resist it! Because they will experience that as society increasingly becomes organised to meet 
the challenges of the 'inevitable' globalisation, the features of the ‘globalised’ world also step-by-step 
becomes true. Thus, the talk about disciplining subjects. 
51 The Focauldian concept of power as the medium through which the social world is produced and 
reproduced, implies that power is not necessarily repressive but also productive, however it also implies 
that being affected by others in one way or in one area of life is no more significant than being affected in 
any other. This is where it runs contrary to the Gramscian conception of power, which can be exercised 
by a social class, affecting the conditions for other social classes, even though a social class’ abilities to 
exercise their power over another are structurally determined. Thus, the Gramscian view on power is that 
it is essentially repressive. 
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and adequacy in the context of an ageing society: the financial sustainability of 
pensions systems is a necessary precondition for an adequate provision of pensions in 
the future, while ensuring adequacy is a precondition for obtaining political support for 
the necessary reforms of pension systems. 
Commission & Council 2003: 9 
As stated in chapter 7, ISG recognizes major problems in setting up indicators that 
consider both the financial and social concerns. The general problem by producing 
indicators is the difficulty in creating reliable and comparable quantitative information 
on adequacy and inclusion, whereas quantitative financial sustainability indicators are 
further developed. As Geert de Cock from AGE puts it:  
(...) you can't say what is an absolute adequate income, because in Estonia you live 3 
months for 500 Euro and in Luxembourg that’s peanuts. So you can't work with 
absolute figures, you know. In the UK they have free health care and how do you take 
that into account? 
Geert de Cock, April 2006 
This quote reflects a well known methodological problem with measuring poverty and 
inequality, which is the other side of the coin, of adequate social protection. In order to 
make credible – or at least statistically backed - claims about poverty or inequality in a 
society you need to measure the ‘full income’ of the citizens, which is the ‘money 
income’ plus the ‘non-money income’ – e.g. free health care, food stamps or different 
discounts on public services. Since ‘non-money’ income is very hard to measure, the 
‘money income’ alone is often used as an unreliable proxy for the ‘full income’. On top 
of this comes a discussion about whether to measure poverty in absolute or relative 
terms, and whether your political aim is equality of opportunity or of income. (Barr 
2004: 150) Furthermore, the fact that the member states of the EU25 have very different 
levels of average income as well as welfare system-designs, makes the process even 
harder. As a consequence the financial aspects get more in focus, because more 
condensed information about countries relative performance is reflected in the financial 
indicators (Schludi 2003: 36).  
 
Another feature that should be considered is the fact that the Commission in 2000 was 
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given a mandate from the Lisbon Council, to study in depth how to improve quality of 
public expenditures – meaning how the public finances can be invested in a good way 
e.g. in innovation, education and other fields that can increase employment and growth 
(Pochet & Natali 2004: 11). According to Pochet and Natali (2004) this opens up for a 
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ public expenditure, where public funded PAYG-
pensions per se are on the top of the list of ‘bad’ expenditure since it relies on demand 
side stimulations that exclude growth and employment stimulations, and since the 
underlying assumption is that public budgets need to be reduced. We argue that this 
good/bad distinction is also mirrored in the content of the OMC of pensions. In e.g. the 
objectives covering the financial sustainability of pensions (the objectives 4 to 8 – see 
Appendix). These objectives strongly focus on supporting employment and keeping 
workers longer in the labour market, as well as sound regulatory frameworks that ensure 
an optimal interplay between public and private pensions – in sum; keep the ‘bad’ 
expenditures low. Objective 6 states even more explicitly that reduction of public debt 
should be prioritised in reference to the framework of BEPG and SGP, which severely 
constrains the possible ‘generosity’ of welfare systems – and thus also pension systems 
reformed – under the OMC of pensions. Thus, we see a clear bias in the directions and 
possibilities deriving from the objectives adopted in the OMC of pensions. 
  
With this intense focus on the financial aspects, which have more well defined goals to 
achieve; the economic actors and institutions like EPC gets a stronger say in the field of 
pensions. This is due to their ability to deliver clear and comprehensible information on 
financial predictions, whereas SPC gets stuck in quantitative trouble on how to measure 
adequate pensions for now and the future. In our interview with two Commission policy 
officers working in connection with the EPC, we found recognition of this imbalance 
between indicators for adequacy and sustainability. To our question on whether the 
benchmarks in the economic area are more developed than the benchmarks on adequate 
income; the answer was: 
Aino Salomäki: Well…You don’t only have one view of that. Almost every member 
state say in their report that they consider their level of pensions to be adequate. 
However there are large differences between them. No member state could consider 
that their protection is too low [laugh] 
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Jan Høst Schmidt: They wouldn’t put it on paper [laugh] 
Aino Salomäki: So…one cannot really make such a benchmark of what is an adequate 
income but one can measure net replacement rates, relative income, and that kind of 
things. And furthermore income measures are present or backwards looking but 
sustainability are forward looking. It is projections…not yet an acute problem…but it 
might become in the future.  
Aino Salomäki & Jan Høst Schmidt, April 2006  
What is expressed here may not come as a surprise, but it surely pulls the carpet away 
under the OMC of pensions, as a tool for identifying ‘best practice’ while paying equal 
attention to social and economic concerns. Based on the premise that the principles of 
adequacy and sustainability are inseparable, the fact that member states allegedly are 
ready to dress-up the conclusions of their NSRs (cf. the quote above), reveals that the 
principle of adequacy becomes are mere question of keeping up appearances. 
10.3 SUMMARY 
As we see it, the OMC of pensions has a ‘strategic selectivity’ which favours neo-liberal 
projects at the expense of the social democratic project. This is reflected both in the 
technical difficulties in measuring an adequate income opposed to the more clear-cut 
financial calculations but also in the implicit ranking of public-pensions as a ‘bad’ 
expenditure.  We will claim that we are dealing with a case of embedded neo-liberalism 
where the social aspects are ancillary to the economic aspects. The social concerns are 
surely present both in speak and writing, but surely not in the same league as the 
economic and financial concerns.    
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11 Conclusions 
 
This project has aspired to explore the following question: 
 
How are competing political projects reflected in the debate of European pension 
reforms and how is this struggle manifested in the design of the OMC of pensions? 
11.1 THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERAL HEGENOMY 
This project sought to reveal the political dimension of the debate of European pension 
reforms. Our analysis has shown that two opposing political projects can be identified in 
the European debate on pension reforms; a social democratic and a neo-liberal.  
Starting with the neo-liberal project; it managed to raise substantial attention to itself in 
the mid 1990s, when dramatic phrases such as ‘the pension time bomb’, the ‘biggest 
challenge of our time’ and a ‘limited window of opportunity to react’ were voiced by 
the neo-liberals – namely organized business and think tanks. With these bombastic 
statements, the neo-liberal project tried – and succeeded – to condensate the complex 
economics of pension reforms down to one simple point: something must be done 
immediately with public pensions, if the European economy should not be left in 
financial ruin. Forecasts of the demographic transitions unmistakeably proved - they 
argued - that public spending would explode, well beyond the restrictions set by the 
SGP due to the redistributive nature of PAYG pension-systems, which were also 
characterized as being too generous by one of the major social forces, the ERT.  
Adopting the corporate mindset of the imperative of competitiveness, the neo-liberals 
strongly advocated that funded schemes would effectively avoid this tragedy – while 
also providing a response to an even greater enigma, the challenges posed on the 
European economy by the forces of globalization. The position – most prominently 
taken by organized business as the ERT, UNICE, think tank Federal Trust and global 
enterprises like PriceWaterHouseCoopers – is distinctive for the neo-liberal project; an 
unshakable conviction that if the market forces could be emancipated, the problem 
would seize to exist. Implicit in this idea is the neo-liberal ontological distrust in 
governments' ability to effectively allocate economic resources. Therefore, governments 
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should revise their trust in universal welfare, such as public PAYG pensions, in favour 
of the dynamics of the self-regulating market. This intent to re-organize welfare where 
benefits are based on social rights, into workfare where benefits are earned by 
participating in the labour market, is also typical of the neo-liberal project. In fact, this 
Schumpeterian-inspired workfare society – which supposedly should enhance 
flexibility, innovation and thus competitiveness – seems to be the neo-liberal project’s 
recipe for success in Europe - not only in the pension area but also more broadly in 
employment, health care, innovation etc. (all incorporated into the Lisbon Agenda, 
which embody the desire for securing Europe's competitiveness).  
By contrast, the social democratic project cannot be characterized as an action, but 
rather as a reaction to the neo-liberal project. In this sense, the social democratic project 
appears to be defined negatively in relation to the neo-liberal ideology and punch-lines. 
The social forces, represented by organized interests like ETUC/FERPA/AGE/Social 
Platform etc. are actively rejecting the neo-liberal claim, that the market is the only 
solution to the pension problem but, ironically, they all seem convinced that the 
‘European Social Model’ can be protected, even though this have never really existed – 
not in law nor in fact. In stead of mobilizing their efforts to come up with a combined, 
coherent response to the neo-liberals, the social forces were – and are - divided and 
present an array of rather inconsistent social democratic ideas, in stead of a uniform 
project. 
Time sequence is also crucial in the manner the two projects were reflected in the 
debate of pension reforms. At the time when organized interests in the social democratic 
project finally responded, the neo-liberal project had already gained a substantial 
momentum and had established its arguments – both in media and member states but 
most significantly at the European political stage. In effect, the neo-liberal project had at 
this point in time gained hegemony. The particular interests of global business – a view 
promoted by the ERT and other actors of transnational capitalism – had successfully 
been portrayed as the universal interest of all Europeans, even though some social 
forces were still trying to define a counter hegemonic social democratic project. 
However, the ideas for the social democratic project were in themselves influenced by 
the tacit acceptance of neo-liberal mantras such as competitiveness. 
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11.2 PRESENTING A COMPLETE PACKAGE 
In the late 1990’s, the Commission was in need of new ideas. It had been tormented by 
the fall of the Santer Commission, economic stagnation and lack of charismatic 
leadership, thus it was desperately seeking to re-invent itself. The neo-liberals were not 
slow to respond to this opportunity. After all, they had a complete political package 
available with their market formula for how to re-arrange the European political 
economy. Just what the Commission was craving. The answers were to enhance the 
competitiveness of the whole European economy, by applying a framework borrowed 
from the corporate world and inspired by the Schumpeterian workfare model. This 
package deal would materialize in the vastly ambitious Lisbon Strategy. In the Lisbon 
Agenda, it was evident that the neo-liberals wanted welfare to be competitive. Since the 
EU had few legal competencies to legislate on these matters a functional tool of 
governance was provided – the Open Method of Coordination.  
The OMC of pensions is a clear-cut example of the influence the neo-liberal project has 
had on the European level. First of all, its design was to a large degree copied from the 
recommendations, the ERT had provided few years before; focusing on “common 
principles underlying the reform” which must be “implemented across a broad front 
involving the European Union, Member States and social partners” (ERT 2000). These 
recommendations were directly acted out in the design of the OMC by the Commission; 
setting three principles and 11 objectives as guidance and included precisely ‘the broad 
front’, mentioned by the ERT, in the process. The catalyst for the OMC of pensions 
would be benchmarking - a concept borrowed from the corporate world and free 
market-loving organization like the OECD – that was also entailed in the neo-liberal 
formula for success (securing competitiveness) in Europe. In fact the first 
recommendations for EU processes on pension reforms were exclusively focussed on 
the financial sustainability problem and did not put any focus on social protection – this 
was only added later. Despite the fact that ‘adequacy’ is one of the three principles the 
OMC of pensions aims at achieving, our empirical study shows that ‘adequacy’ is 
regarded as almost impossible to measure in quantitative terms. This underlines another 
important conclusion: when the social democratic project was re-launched and 
integrated into the OMC of pensions, it was at the same time being embedded into the 
neo-liberal project. This was evident in the acceptance of the overall framework, which 
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the focus on adequacy and the SPC was situated in. This implied that social democratic 
– i.e. Keynesian – solutions were already secondary to neo-liberal solutions, in the 
design alone. Hence, in neo-Gramscian terms, the social democratic project was 
‘assimilated’ into the neo-liberal project. Thereby the actors advocating the social 
democratic project became part of a larger ‘historic bloc’ of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. 
The historic bloc was thus institutionalised – or manifested – into the framework of the 
OMC and - in regards to pensions - in the EPC and SPC.  
11.3 WHY WAS THE OMC OF PENSIONS CREATED? 
After having established that the neo-liberal project has directly influenced and shaped 
the OMC of pensions, another – and more important – question arises. Why did this 
happen? 
It is of course not without reasons that the neo-liberal project is most prominently 
advocated by the ‘capitalist’ social forces. As we have showed, the neo-liberal project in 
itself favours the interest of business. A growing influence of the neo-liberal project on 
the field of pensions indicates a strengthening of the power of the social forces of 
business. By promoting pension reforms, the neo-liberals can push forward a project 
that would enhance their own power and increase their profits substantially – namely 
the opening of a new financial market in the EU, a market for pan-European funded 
pensions. In order to achieve this lucrative goal, the neo-liberals needed to mobilize 
political reforms and this is most easily done at the EU level. As we showed in chapter 
6, the EU has had a ‘strategic selectivity’ favouring the neo-liberal project due to among 
other things the EU’s ‘constitutional asymmetry’ – the fact that more economic than 
social legislation is part of the acquis – and its ‘new constitutionalist’ tendencies. 
Hence, the neo-liberal project on pensions had from the beginning an interest in moving 
the debate on pensions to the EU level. 
Another factor strengthens this assumption. The neo-liberal project advocates more 2nd 
and 3rd pillar pensions which imply a strengthening of the private sector at the expense 
of the public sector. Thus it is convenient for the neo-liberal project to move the issue 
away from the national states where the 1st pillar pensions are subject to substantive 
path-dependencies and the stubbornness of national governments to initiate reforms. 
Our research confirms this explanation. We have seen how influential organisations and 
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persons such as ERT and Carlo Benedetti managed to raise the debate on the European 
level and integrate their ideas in the OMC of pensions.  
The creation of the OMC of pensions can therefore be seen as a reflection of the global 
neo-liberal hegemony we described in chapter 5. However, it is important to emphasise 
that the neo-liberal hegemony at the European level becomes much more ‘embedded’ 
due to the strong position of the social democratic project in the European welfare 
states.  
Another important point to make is that the neo-liberal influence on the OMC of 
pensions would not have been there without the action of powerful social actors. 
Without actors such as ERT and the OECD, the OMC of pensions would probably not 
have had the same ‘social purpose’ as it has today. This issue is also relevant when 
looking at the social democratic project. After the Delors-era this project seems to be 
bewildered and desperately seeking a new charismatic and influential leader.   
11.4 DESTINATION UNKNOWN 
Having established that the OMC of pensions must be characterized as a vehicle for the 
promotion of the neo-liberal European order, it is worthwhile addressing the future of 
social protection. Whether the OMC of pensions will pass on the neo-liberal agenda to 
national welfare states is a matter of conjecture. The ‘worst case scenario’ would be a 
de-regulatory race to the bottom. With the social dimension so deeply rooted in the neo-
liberal agenda, concern must be voiced over the protection of genuine social aspects of 
welfare. After all, welfare is not something to be taken for granted and although the 
OMC of pensions is not the start of a ‘supranational European Social Model’, it should 
be recognized as a transnational mode of governance through which welfare issues such 
as pensions are coordinated and influenced. While the factual effect on national welfare 
regimes is hard to asses, the idea of such a mode of governance – especially with the 
described ideological content – should in itself raise attention.  
 
In this project we have been analysing and criticising this neo-liberal agenda. As 
Nielsen (2006) has pointed out the neo-liberal stamp is typically applied by researchers 
in a connection where the aim is to re-politicize a discursive field that otherwise is 
characterised by being de-politicised and naturalised. "Whereas neo-liberalism is linked 
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to the thesis that there are no alternatives, the usage of the concept on the other hand 
implies that there are alternatives." (Nielsen 2006; 6) (our own translation52). This 
captures very well our criticism of the neo-liberal agenda including the globalisation 
project and the competitiveness discourse, which are often articulated as inevitabilities. 
One of our underlying assumptions in our research has been that this indeed does not 
hold true, and that 'the logic of no alternative' is a scam hiding the true nature of these 
processes, including the real driving forces behind them as well as the actors benefiting 
the most from them. In this connection, it should be noted that the claim that the 
inevitability discourse is inherently ideological, is not the same as e.g. the claim that 
countries must be highly competitive to survive is necessarily untrue (Fairclough 2003: 
9-10). Our argument is that this might be true, under certain man-made conditions, 
which can indeed be changed, if there is political will to do so. Even then, changes 
might be long and cumbersome, as the institutions and structures upholding these 
conditions will have a 'social purpose' and a 'strategic selectivity' on its own, making 
them subject to strong path-dependencies. 
 
The future will show when and how a serious counter-hegemonic alternative to the neo-
liberal agenda will rise, with the political will to break these path dependencies and the 
'constitutional asymmetry' of the EU at large. But, as long as the counter-projects accept 
the neo-liberal ‘rules of the game’ they will remain embedded in the historic bloc of 
neo-liberal hegemony. This is crucial because as it is now the social-democratic forces 
in fact serves to legitimize the hegemony by giving it a ‘social’ touch. A more ‘social 
Europe’ is possible but action and ‘political ideological leadership’ must be mobilized 
independently of the neo-liberal project. A positive and forward-looking definition of 
what the ‘European social model’ entails is needed; otherwise the hegemony will keep 
on re-defining it in neo-liberal terms. 
 
                                                 
 
52 The quote in Danish: "Hvor nyliberalisme forbindes med tesen om, at der ikke er nogen alternativer, så 
indebærer begrebets anvendelse til gengæld, at der er alternativer."  
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Appendix 
 
The full wording of the 11 objectives of the OMC on pensions 
(from SPC & EPC 2001) 
 
Adequacy of pensions. 
Member States should safeguard the capacity of pension systems to meet their social 
objectives. To this end against the background of their specific national circumstances 
they should: 
1. Ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent 
standard of living; that they share in the economic well-being of their country 
and can accordingly participate actively in public, social and cultural life53; 
2. Provide access for all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements, public 
and/or private, which allow them to earn pension entitlements enabling them to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement; and 
3. Promote solidarity within and between generations. 
 
Financial sustainability of pension systems 
Member States should follow a multi-faceted strategy to place pension systems on a 
sound financial footing, including a suitable combination of policies to: 
4. Achieve a high level of employment through, where necessary, comprehensive 
labour market reforms, as provided by the European Employment Strategy and 
in a way consistent with the BEPG. 
5. Ensure that, alongside labour market and economic policies, all relevant 
branches of social protection, in particular pension systems, offer effective in-
centives for the participation of older workers; that workers are not encouraged 
to take up early retirement and are not penalised for staying in the labour market 
                                                 
 
53 In this respect, benefits and tax advantages other than pensions should also be taken into account where 
appropriate. 
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beyond the standard retirement age; and that pension systems facilitate the op-
tion of gradual retirement; 
6. Reform pension systems in appropriate ways taking into account the overall ob-
jective of maintaining the sustainability of public finances. At the same time sus-
tainability of pension systems needs to be accompanied by sound fiscal policies, 
including, where necessary, a reduction of debt54. Strategies adopted to meet this 
objective may also include setting up dedicated pension reserve funds; 
7. Ensure that pension provisions and reforms maintain a fair balance between the 
active and the retired by not overburdening the former and by maintaining ade-
quate pensions for the latter; and 
8. Ensure, through appropriate regulatory frameworks and through sound manage-
ment, that private and public funded pension schemes can provide pensions with 
the required efficiency, affordability, portability and security. 
 
Modernisation of pension systems in response to changing needs of the economy, 
society and individuals. 
9. Ensure that pension systems are compatible with the requirements of flexibility 
and security on the labour market; that, without prejudice to the coherence of 
Member States' tax systems, labour market mobility within Member States and 
across borders and non-standard employment forms do not penalise people's 
pension entitlements and that self-employment is not discouraged by pension 
systems; 
10. Review pension provisions with a view to ensuring the principle of equal treat-
ment between women and men, taking into account obligations under EU law; 
and 
11. Make pension systems more transparent and adaptable to changing circum-
stances, so that citizens can continue to have confidence in them. Develop reli-
able and easy-to-understand information on the long-term perspectives of pen-
sion systems, notably with regard to the likely evolution of benefit levels and 
                                                 
 
54 Member States strategies to ensure sound and sustainable public finances are reported and assessed in 
the framework of the BEPG and the Stabililty and Growth Pact and should be in accordance with these. 
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contribution rates. Promote the broadest possible consensus regarding pension 
policies and reforms. Improve the methodological basis for efficient monitoring 
of pension reforms and policies. 
 
 
